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BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATION:
EXPERIMENTATION AND
IMMIGRATION LAW
JOSEPH LANDAU†
ABSTRACT
In debates about executive branch authority and policy innovation,
scholars have focused on two overarching relationships—horizontal
tension between the president and Congress and the vertical interplay
of federal and state authority. However, these debates have
overlooked the role of frontline bureaucratic officials in advancing
the laws they administer. This Article looks to immigration law—in
which lower-level federal officers exercise discretion delegated down
throughout federal agencies—to identify how bottom-up agency
influences can inform categorical, across-the-board executive branch
policy.
In this Article, I argue that decisions by frontline officers can and
should be better harnessed to pair local laboratories of executive
experimentation with opportunities for interchange throughout
various levels of the administrative bureaucracy. Notwithstanding the
predominant (and often accurate) view that on-the-ground enforcers
resist innovation, many frontline immigration officers have
demonstrated willingness, and an ability, to put their discretion
toward creative ends.
By exploring the interplay between bottom-up and top-down
policymaking, this Article provides a useful counterweight to a
number
of
conventional
theories
regarding
presidential
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administration, offering insights into debates about agency design and
administrative constitutionalism. The relationship between on-theground enforcement and across-the-board executive action can also
lend greater legitimacy to the Obama administration’s deferred action
programs—both in the federal courts and the court of public opinion.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Obama administration’s signature
1
immigration initiatives, commentators have taken a renewed interest
in the function of presidential power in bringing innovation to
2
immigration law. Much of the literature has focused on two
overarching relationships—horizontal tension between the president
and Congress and the vertical interplay of federal and state authority.
Scholars of administrative law have argued that administrative
agencies tend to ossify and become resistant to change, requiring a
series of top-down commands by the president and cabinet
3
members —“an injection of energy and leadership” that higher-level
4
officials are best suited to provide. Meanwhile, federalism scholars
see state and local action as promoting policy innovation that cannot
5
be forged on a national scale.

1. The Obama administration’s policies, discussed infra at notes 22–23 and accompanying
text, would afford deferred action to millions of undocumented foreign nationals. The
administration’s 2014 deferred action policies have been halted nationwide by a federal court
injunction. See infra note 25.
2. See, e.g., SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015); Kate Andrias, The President’s
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez,
The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015); Anil Kalhan, Deferred
Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on
Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 59 (2015); Michael W. McConnell, Why
Obama’s Immigration Order Was Blocked, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2015, at A15; Eric Posner,
Faithfully Executed: Obama’s New Immigration Program Is Perfectly Legal and Should Not Be
Blocked, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2015, 3:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ politics/
view_from_chicago/2015/02/obama_s_dapa_immigration_program_is_legal_judge_hanen_s_
injunction_will.single.html [http://perma.cc/K7ZA-JQU4]; Peter M. Shane, Judge Hanen’s
Misconceptions and the Legality of Deferred Action, ACS BLOG (Mar. 16, 2015), http://
www.acslaw.org/acsblog/judge-hanen’s-misconceptions-and-the-legality-of-deferred-action
[http://perma.cc/8J8N-T83T].
3. Andrias, supra note 2, at 1054–69; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 135–42. For
additional sources discussing presidential influences on agency action, see generally James F.
Blumenstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and
Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851 (2001); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1994); Jennifer Nou, Agency SelfInsulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013); Matthew C. Stephenson,
Optimal Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008).
4. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2344.
5. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1122 (2014);
Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133, 1152 (2014); Heather K. Gerken, A New
Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J., Spring 2012, http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/anew-progressive-federalism.php?page=all [http://perma.cc/9B6C-PXWA]; see also Thomas W.
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Although commentators have noted how presidential
6
administrations and state legislatures can fill a gap left by Congress,
they have generally not considered ways that frontline officers can
advance the laws they administer. This Article assesses various
sources of bottom-up lower-level innovation by analyzing
immigration enforcement discretion—in particular the relationship
between case-by-case exercises of discretion on the ground and
categorical executive policies. Its account of bureaucratic
administration offers alternatives to conventional analyses of the
Obama administration’s 2012 and 2014 initiatives, which are generally
7
couched in the president’s immigration power in particular, or his
8
constitutional enforcement power more generally. And while most
Kelty, Federalism: While the Stewards Slept . . . New York v. United States, 29 URB. LAW. 529,
548 (1997) (noting that “states serve as laboratories for experimentation”); Clifford Larsen,
States Federal, Financial, Sovereign and Social. A Critical Inquiry into an Alternative to
American Financial Federalism, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 477–78 (1999) (“[T]he United States
also looks to the concept of the ‘laboratory of the states’ as a method for increasing government
efficiency.”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 567 (2008) (explaining the significance of state and local actors).
6. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006) (“Publius’s view of separation
of powers presumes three branches with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers, yet
legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi.”); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the
Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 19 (2014) (arguing that conditions of abject
congressional failure can give rise to more permissible and broader invocations of presidential
power).
7. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 130–35 (discussing presidential immigration
power through the structure of immigration law as a whole); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 510 (2009) (“In
immigration law, there exists a broader basis than in many other areas of law for defending
inherent authority as a matter of constitutional design.”).
8. See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The Obama Administration, the DREAM Act
and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (arguing that President Obama
breached his constitutional duty to “enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all
situations and cases” and that there was no such thing as a kind of “nonenforcement power”
that can legitimate across-the-board deferred action policies); John Yoo, Opinion, Obama has
Pursued a Dangerous Change in the Powers of the President, FOX NEWS (Oct. 12, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/10/12/obama-has-pursued-dangerous-change-in-powerspresident [http://perma.cc/A4R2-AZCW] (accusing President Obama of “push[ing] the
executive power beyond all constitutional limits” and “deploy[ing] discretion to rewrite a
federal law”); see also David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Editorial, Obama’s Illegal Move on
Immigration, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2011, at A11 (noting that the president has crossed the line
because although he “is entitled to establish enforcement priorities . . . the ultimate goal must
always be” to execute the law as it was enacted by Congress); Kimberley A. Strassel, Obama’s
Imperial Presidency, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2012, at A11 (arguing that DACA is one of many
examples of the president granting himself “unprecedented power”); Michael D. Shear, Obama,
Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech.html [http://perma.cc/X6V8-
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scholarly treatments of the bureaucracy—both within immigration
9
law and administrative law more generally—focus on how frontline
10
officers have resisted change and necessitated top-down constraints,
this Article posits that bottom-up influences can help create—and
11
even legitimate—categorical exercises of executive action.
Because the administrative process is predicated on “two
different sorts of legitimacy[,] political (democratic will) and
12
bureaucratic (expertise),”
the interplay between lower-level
enforcement
decisions
and
across-the-board
immigration
enforcement policy has important doctrinal and theoretical
13
dimensions. Although the variances that come with frontline
14
discretion can raise difficult normative questions, the relationship
between on-the-ground decisions and large-scale categorical
enforcement programs has important, legitimacy-conferring benefits
for executive policy—especially as President Obama has endeavored
15
to fill voids created by congressional abdication.
LLPG] (noting that House Majority leader, Kevin McCarthy, has called the Obama
administration’s action “a ‘brazen power grab’”).
9. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle
Behind President Obama’s Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 667 (2016) (pitting
“President [Obama] and his appointed agency heads, who have sought to use prosecutorial
discretion to shield many unauthorized immigrants from deportation” against “frontline
immigration enforcement officers and their union representatives who do not agree with the
President’s agenda”); Kalhan, supra note 2, at 86–89 (describing how frontline officers “actively
resisted” guidance from higher-up policymaking officials purporting to control and direct their
enforcement discretion). Kalhan additionally notes that “[d]espite these efforts [to guide
bureaucratic discretion], enforcement patterns in the field remained inconsistent and diverged
significantly from priorities and guidelines established by policymaking officials.” Id. at 88.
10. Cf. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2344–45 (describing the bureaucracy as “encased in an inert
political system” that “grind[s] inflexibly, in the face of new opportunities and challenges,
toward (at best) irrelevance or (at worst) real harm”).
11. As argued in Part IV, infra, the idea that presidential action enjoys broad agency
support and buy-in could be an important determinant for judicial (and congressional)
deference to top-down immigration-enforcement decisions.
12. Katyal, supra note 6, at 2317; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting that “those with great expertise and charged with responsibility
for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so”).
13. As discussed infra in notes 233–36, 240–50 and accompanying text, an inquiry into
lower-level expertise has the benefit of refocusing analysis on a critical expertise rationale for
administrative action that has tended to erode over time.
14. As explored infra in Part V, because lower-level discretion can interfere with progress,
it requires careful review by top-level policy officials who not only have larger policy goals in
mind, but also accountability for ensuring that discretion—subjective as it is—be dispensed as
responsibly and equitably as possible.
15. See Pozen, supra note 6, at 24–26. Such congressional paralysis is hardly exclusive to the
immigration arena; indeed, scholars have repeatedly remarked on how “the formal institutions
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This Article highlights cases in which frontline officers have used
their discretion to engage in problem solving that was later reinforced
by, and reflected in, categorical resolutions at the highest levels of the
executive. Although it does not offer empirical proof that lower-level
16
bureaucrats actually influence higher-ups, it documents remarkable
correlations between certain groundswells of case-by-case exercises of
discretion and executive branch policy enacted months or years
17
later. Thus, the case studies explored in this Article support
enhancing existing mechanisms to promote greater coordination,
learning, and deliberation among actors at all levels of the
18
bureaucracy. Given the frequency of categorical prosecutorial
discretion programs and attendant concerns of presidential
19
encroachment, accords between higher-level officials and the
bureaucratic corps could be a way of safeguarding executive policy
against congressional or judicial override. In that regard, an

of U.S. constitutional government have become impotent to deal with the nation’s most
important challenges.” Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 479, 480 (2012). For a treatment of a similar phenomenon in the labor-law context, see
James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 221, 223 (2005).
16. But see Deborah Anker, Legal Change from the Bottom Up: The Development of
Gender Asylum Jurisprudence in the United States, in GENDER IN REFUGEE LAW: FROM THE
MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 46, 67 (Efrat Arbel et al. eds., 2014) (“[I]ndeed there is now a
ground-level jurisprudence that is having significant impact on other aspects of refugee law and
decision-making institutions including at higher levels.”).
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. Although current immigration agency structures lack the formal qualities of purely
“experimentalist” governance regimes, the mechanisms described in this Article indicate the
possibility of an enhanced role for lower-level bureaucrats in reinvigorating immigration policy,
supporting the idea that “under favorable conditions[,] the culture can coevolve with decisionmaking practice so that both decisions and the standards for evaluating decisions improve in the
sense of fitting better with the demands placed on the organization.” Charles F. Sabel,
Rethinking the Street-Level Bureaucrat: Tacit and Deliberate Ways Organizations Can Learn, in
ECONOMY IN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MICHAEL J. PIORE 113, 113–42 (Paul Osterman
ed., 2012); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 340 (1998) (“The principal role of the national
government in domestic affairs . . . is to encourage and coordinate this decentralized
decisionmaking, and to protect citizens against abuses of power—especially, and paradoxically,
those abuses that may result from or be exacerbated by the pulverization of central authority
itself.”); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 78 (2011) (calling regimes “experimentalist to the extent
that they are designed to achieve local adaptation and aggregate learning by combining
discretion with duties to report and explain, and by pooling information”).
19. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 2316 (noting concerns raised by “an executive that
subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government”).
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accounting of ground-level experiments could, over time, better serve
top-down executive action.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the literature of
top-down approaches to policy change that generally rely on a
dichotomous framing of bottom-up versus top-down policymaking.
Part II outlines the various roles that lower-level federal officers play
in exercising prosecutorial discretion in removal proceedings—a core
feature of immigration law that enables frontline officers to shape
policy. Part III details four case studies that demonstrate the potential
for bottom-up innovation—deportation relief for the spouses and
partners of LGBT U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents
(LPRs); parole in place for the family members of military personnel;
gender-based asylum protection; and bureaucratic resistance to
draconian, top-down policies mandating detention at the conclusion
of removal proceedings.
These first three Parts lay the groundwork for the normative
arguments made in the balance of the Article. Part IV explores how
frontline enforcement decisions could provide a partial response to
the dwindling availability of statutory deportation relief and limited
mechanisms for judicial review. Moreover, to the extent that case-bycase discretionary decisions coalesce around certain groups of
individuals, categorical discretion policies derived from work on the
ground could warrant greater deference by Congress and the courts.
Part V explains why an analysis of bottom-up innovation complicates
theoretical discussions about ideal administrative-law frameworks,
which tend to favor top-down mechanisms. It argues that
commentators should pay closer attention to bottom-up innovation,
without which it may be difficult to identify who the next DREAMers
20
will be. The Article concludes with suggested reforms that would

20. The term “DREAMers” refers to those who would be eligible to take advantage of a
path to citizenship created by the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors
(DREAM) Act. The DREAM Act—which was first introduced in 2001—would defer
deportation of certain undocumented foreign nationals who came to the United States as
children. See Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2268 n.116 (2013); Julia
Preston, Young Immigrants Say It’s Obama’s Time to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/us/dream-act-gives-young-immigrants-a-political-voice.html
[http://perma.cc/V7BP-YBBD]. Since 2001, a version of the DREAM Act has been introduced
either as a stand-alone bill or as part of other legislation numerous times, including in 2003,
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010, but it has never received enough votes to pass both the
House and the Senate. See Elisha Barron, Recent Development, The Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 631–36, 632 n.77 (2011);
David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18,
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improve ways for higher-level agency officials to learn from
experiments taking place in the field.
I. DISCRETIONARY FORCES AND IMMIGRATION INNOVATION
President Obama’s second term has been defined by bold
exercises of executive action, and nowhere is this truer than
21
immigration. The Obama administration’s 2012 Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program provides a reprieve from
deportation and work authorization to nearly 1.2 million foreign22
national youths who came to the United States as children. The 2014
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (DAPA) program would grant similar opportunities to four
23
million undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs. These
programs have stirred controversy, with congressional Republicans
24
raising the specter of impeachment proceedings, and twenty-six

2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19immig.html [http://perma.cc/4LUJ-3E
PE].
21. See Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-letobama-bypass-congress.html [http://perma.cc/9D6P-WQ3W] (describing President Obama’s
“We Can’t Wait” campaign “to more aggressively use executive power to govern in the face of
Congressional obstructionism”).
22. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t
(June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/LBJ4-Q5N5].
23. The 2014 reforms also include provisions expanding the parameters of DACA relief.
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir.,
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border
Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/33X6-GWS4]. The 2014 reforms have been halted
nationwide under a federal court injunction. See infra note 25.
24. See Jackie Calmes, Some in G.O.P. Fear that Their Hard-Liners Will Alienate Latino
Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/politics/inimmigration-fight-some-in-gop-fear-alienating-latinos.html?action=click&contentCollection=
U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article [http://perma.cc/5UHCUS5N]. Although Congress did not follow through with the impeachment threat, the House of
Representatives passed a number of measures that, if enacted, would invalidate the Obama
administration’s executive actions regarding immigration. See Greg Sargent, GOP Deportation
Priorities, in the Raw, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/01/14/gop-deportation-priorities-in-the-raw [http://perma.cc/QL3N-QD
MS].
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states securing a nationwide district court injunction blocking the
25
2014 reforms.
A. Top-Down Influences in Immigration Law
The scholarly discussion of large-scale categorical programs
tends to revolve around top-down presidential approaches via ex
26
27
ante or ex post presidential control of bureaucratic action.
Although these accounts vary in their assessment of its effectiveness,
the overriding narrative is frequently one of presidential efforts to
overcome administrative ossification, insulation, and inefficiency via
28
an “injection of energy and leadership” into agency action. This
discussion often relies on a dichotomous framing of bottom-up versus
top-down policymaking that explicitly or implicitly tracks a discussion
25. On February 16, 2015, a federal district judge in the Southern District of Texas granted
a nationwide preliminary injunction halting the 2014 deferred action initiatives based on a
theory that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail in arguing that the Obama administration violated
the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to subject the programs to notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015). A
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015). On January 19, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016). The president’s
deferred action policies have been the source of other litigation as well. See infra note 93 and
accompanying text.
26. Ex ante controls are those created when “government authorities and institutional
designers delegate authority to an agent but at the same time set up a structure that constrains
and channels how the agent exercises her discretion.” Matthew C. Stephenson, Information
Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1439 (2011). They function by
specifying, via various substantive and procedural mechanisms, “windows” of agency
discretion—“the set of actions that an agent is allowed to select and the corresponding set of
prohibited actions.” Id. at 1439–46. The president’s appointment of agency leaders with likeminded policy preferences and issuance of administrative directives are examples of ex ante
controls. See Blumenstein, supra note 3, at 895–97 (regarding presidential administrative
directives); Nou, supra note 3, at 1765 (appointments).
27. Ex post controls are those measures by which the president oversees the decisions of
agencies, usually to ensure their compliance with ex ante controls or other policy goals. See Nou,
supra note 3, at 1766–67. Presidential review of agency rulemaking through the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the broader Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) is probably the most well-known example, but discretionary removal of agency
heads is also a form of ex post control. See id. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013)
(describing the structure and application of OIRA review); Steven Croley, White House Review
of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003) (analyzing the
effectiveness of review of agency action).
28. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2344; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1265 (2009) (noting that “[s]cholars have
devoted a great deal of energy to thinking about whether and how Congress or the President
should control administrative agencies”).
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in administrative law about the centralization of authority in the
Office of the President and the tools available to that office to control
29
vast portions of the administrative state.
In contrast to this more conventional, top-down approach, a
number of scholars have highlighted the importance of involving the
bureaucracy through interagency review, coordination among
different levels of actors among various agencies, and opportunities
30
for filtering up comments from lower-level officers. Although these
accounts have important implications for immigration enforcement,
they may not adequately speak to the detailed and specific ways that
frontline decisionmakers can affect agency reform. For example,
frontline officers within the immigration bureaucracy have for
decades made use of the president’s enforcement authority in their
ordinary immigration enforcement decisions—at times putting those
powers to creative ends. Although even the president’s most forceful
adversaries do not dispute the validity of this source of bureaucratic
31
power, there is little scholarly inquiry into how expertise at lower

29. See Blumenstein, supra note 3, at 895–97; Kagan, supra note 3; Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 3; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
30. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1173–81 (2012) (noting the executive’s “well-established coordination
instruments” such as its appointment powers, OIRA review, policy memoranda, and ability to
create high-level task forces and councils in order to bring about meaningful agency
coordination); Terry Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and Politics of Structure, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 16–18 (1994) (discussing how the executive branch “is not a hierarchy of
[individuals,] but, more than perhaps any other major political institution, a team” where
decisionmaking is delegated to lower-level actors, subject to various top-level control
mechanisms (emphasis added)); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213
(2015) (arguing that executive “pooling” of administrative resources “augments [administrative]
capacity by mixing and matching resources dispersed across the bureaucracy”); cf. Jon D.
Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New
Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 16), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2656498 [http://perma.cc/8ULH-XRAU] (reorienting
bureaucratic control around “three constitutional branches working with, and against, three
administrative rivals—which are simultaneously engaged in their own exercises of horizontal
checking, balancing, and collaborating” and promoting a “two-dimensional understanding of
vertical and horizontal engagement [that] illuminates a far more complicated set of connections,
alliances, and conflicts,” exposing “the existence of a tripartite system of separated and checked
administrative power that opens, forecloses, strengthens, and alters opportunities for
constitutional actors to intervene”).
31. Notably, the plaintiff states in the Texas litigation did not challenge the Obama
administration’s enforcement priority guidelines, nor did the district court’s preliminary
injunction alter or address those enforcement priorities. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d
134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 784 (“It is true that
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levels of the immigration bureaucracy might enhance across-the32
board executive action. Commentators have instead focused
primarily on the top-down nature of executive discretion as
exemplified by the Obama administration’s 2012 and 2014 initiatives.
The wrangle over executive deferred action programs provides a
useful entrée into policy innovations that emerge and take shape in
the field, where agency officers have at times exercised their
delegated powers in new and creative ways. Although scholars of
administrative law and political science have described the effect of
lower-level policy implementation on public perception of
33
administrative policy goals,
the expansiveness of executive
prosecutorial discretion programs has produced little inquiry into
internal separation of powers within the executive or the role of the
34
bureaucracy in promoting policy innovation.
Yet ordinary
bureaucrats can promote innovation, and there are good reasons,
particularly in immigration, for “public administration [to] integrate

enforcement cannot occur in all circumstances. The ordinary, efficient administration of the law
requires discretionary decision making on the part of enforcers.”).
32. For empirical investigations into the bases upon which frontline officers have exercised
favorable discretion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries
of Deferred Action Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345, 347 (2013) [hereinafter Wadhia,
Great FOIA Adventure]; Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819, 820 (2004). Both articles are discussed infra in Part III.C.
33. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY, at xii (1980) (“[T]he
decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to
cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry
out.”); see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion,
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2000) (noting a “new
administrative paradigm . . . characterized by a return to discretionary forms of administration
and an increase in the power that ground-level administrators wield over benefit recipients”);
Susan S. Silbey, Case Processing: Consumer Protection in an Attorney General’s Office, 15 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 849, 850 (“[C]hoosing among courses of action and inaction, individual law
enforcement officers become the agents of clarification and elaboration of their own authorizing
mandates. Bureaucrats become lawmakers, ‘freely’ creating . . . law beyond written rules or
courtroom practices.” (citations omitted)).
34. For an exception, see Sabel, supra note 18, at 117 (arguing for “the existence of formal
institutions” in which frontline ingenuity would drive “organizational learning”). Cf. Diller,
supra note 33, at 1130 (“[A]dministration cannot be separated easily from policy. The way that
welfare offices are structured and operate becomes as much an instrument of welfare policy as
eligibility rules and requirements [set by high-level administrators].”); Silbey, supra note 33, at
850 (“By choosing among courses of action and inaction, individual law enforcement officers
become agents of clarification and elaboration of their own authorizing mandates. Bureaucrats
become lawmakers . . . [creating] ‘law in action.’” (citations omitted)).

LANDAU IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1184

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2016 10:28 PM

[Vol. 65:1173

frontline discretion and stake-holder participation in a disciplined,
35
accountable manner.”
In the deportation context, frontline officers have been directed
to utilize their vast enforcement discretion to make accommodations
in meritorious cases, and they have, at times, used their discretion
creatively, addressing problems that higher-level officials were unable
or unwilling to resolve—at least at first. In some cases, categorical
decisions made at the upper echelons of the agency have reflected
lower-level enforcement decisions that appeared to reach a saturation
point. Although supporters and detractors of the president’s policies
remain locked in debate—with critics accusing the president of failing
36
to properly execute the law, and supporters positioning the
president’s actions within a long and established historical
37
pedigree —commentators have not considered ways that categorical
executive policies might draw support from case-by-case decisions
made on the ground. A more sustained treatment of the latter could
yield valuable insights into across-the-board prosecutorial discretion
programs both as a matter of theory and doctrine. The Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized the “broad discretion exercised by
immigration officials” who “as an initial matter[] must decide whether
38
it makes sense to pursue removal at all.” An appreciation of case-bycase discretion and its relationship to categorical programs such as
DACA and DAPA could become an important aspect of the

35. Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 56.
36. See supra note 8.
37. See, e.g., David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The
Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012)
(arguing that congressional intent and consistent agency practices support the Obama
administration’s 2012 prosecutorial discretion program for childhood arrivals); Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 59, 60 (2013) (noting that “prosecutorial discretion actions like DACA have
been pursued by other presidents and part of the immigration system for at least thirty-five
years”); Letter from Immigration Law Professors to President Barack Obama (May 28, 2012),
http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754 [http://perma.cc/8ZVY-52E8] (noting that deferred
action is “one of many forms of prosecutorial discretion available to the Executive Branch”);
Ilya Somin, Obama, Immigration, and the Rule of Law [Updated with Additional Material on
Precedents for Obama’s Action, and a Response to Timothy Sandefur], WASH. POST: THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/11/20/obama-immigration-and-the-rule-of-law [http://perma.cc/N8AD-BT
ML] (noting “past presidents such as Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush have
systematically exempted large numbers of illegal immigrants from deportation”).
38. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
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conversation about the legitimacy of executive branch prosecutorial
discretion programs.
B. Bottom-Up Sources of Immigration Innovation
Most of the discussion surrounding the Obama administration’s
prosecutorial discretion policies focuses on the horizontal separation
of powers between Congress and the president. Adam Cox and
Cristina Rodríguez, building on their seminal work in this area, have
provided a theory of “presidential policymaking” predicated largely
39
on a top-down theory of executive action. This latest account,
focusing on President Obama’s expanded deferred action programs,
treats bureaucratic officers with understandable skepticism given the
resistance to 2010 and 2011 enforcement memoranda directing
40
favorable exercises of prosecutorial discretion in meritorious cases.
Other commentators who favor top-down approaches discuss how
White House involvement can enhance the legitimacy of executive
branch deferred action programs. For example, Kate Andrias argues
in favor of a more high-level regulatory process for enforcement
decisions akin to the role of Office of Information and Regulatory
41
Affairs (OIRA) in the rulemaking process. She argues that this
additional overlay of White House review should be formalized to
promote coordination and transparency in other administrative
42
arenas in which agencies exercise enforcement discretion.
This Article instead focuses on lower-level bureaucratic officers,
who have exercised the president’s law-enforcement discretion for
decades and whose decisions can be informative and influential on
higher-level policymakers. On a macro level, this dynamic plays out
between the agencies and subagencies that administer immigration
law. These institutions have a wealth of regulatory experience and
expertise that can not only inform the work of other executive
43
departments, but also influence the president to support broad

39. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 224 (endorsing “presidential policymaking
through enforcement . . . in the immigration context”).
40. Id. at 191–92.
41. Andrias argues that enforcement policies such as DACA can be evaluated based on the
amount of transparency the White House brings to the policy. Andrias, supra note 2, at 1066–67
(noting, as features of executive transparency, a presidential Rose Garden speech and White
House blog entry).
42. Id. at 1067.
43. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 2345–48 (describing how bureaucratic overlap can provide
an internal checking function).
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executive action or induce Congress to take legislative action. On a
micro level, the dynamic involves the influence of frontline expertise
in a conversation with higher-level officials about the appropriate use
of enforcement resources. Bureaucratic officers, exercising discretion
delegated down through the immigration agencies and memorialized
within decades of top-down directives, can shape longstanding agency
practices and “administrative common law” to influence and help
44
drive across-the-board action throughout the agency.
Although these kinds of bottom-up influences would not
45
approximate a purely experimentalist regime, they could foster some
of the benefits associated with experimentalism, including the type of
reflexive dynamic, or feedback loop, that can develop in the interplay
between exercises of frontline enforcement and decisions by upperechelon officials. Such a process would allow for additional
experimentation, bottom-up influence, and across-the-board
46
policymaking. Recognizing the benefits of such a dynamic would
bring into sharper focus the critical role of dedicated frontline officers
in shaping innovative policies. Although the president assuredly
“use[s the] powers expressly delegated to him by Congress to advance

44. See infra Part IV. For a broader discussion of higher-level consideration by the White
House and the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in using precedent to create more articulated
standards of conduct, see generally Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—At
OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259 (2015).
45. Under a truly experimentalist regime, varied approaches taken by actors within the
agency would be compiled and assessed by higher-ups. The agency would analyze this data to
see what advantages and disadvantages are associated with each experiment as the basis for
implementing new policies. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalism in the EU:
Common Ground and Persistent Differences, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 410, 411 (2012)
(“[E]xperimentalist decisionmaking . . . is in effect an acknowledgment that no one at the center
can have a panoramic view of the situation, but local actors cannot rely exclusively on their
immediate experience. The best way to correct the limitations of each vantage point is to view it
from the other.”).
46. Cf. Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 169, 169–70 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011). As Sabel and Zeitlin
explain, “[e]xperimentalist governance in its most developed form involves a multi-level
architecture” with four key features that “are linked in an iterative cycle.” Id. That cycle
includes “broad framework goals and metrics . . . established by some combination of ‘central’
and ‘local’ units, in consultation with relevant civil society stakeholders”; “local units [that] are
given broad discretion to pursue these goals in their own way”; routine reporting by local units
“on their performance,” subject to “a peer review in which their results are compared with those
of others employing different means to the same ends”; and periodic review of “the goals,
metrics, and decision-making procedures themselves . . . by a widening circle of actors in
response to the problems and possibilities revealed by the review process,” after which “the
cycle repeats.” Id.
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47

his own immigration agenda,” that agenda—not to mention that of
cabinet and other high-level agency officials—should also be
informed by the expertise of frontline officers who exercise discretion
48
in their daily enforcement of immigration law.
II. THE STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF IMMIGRATION
EXPERIMENTATION
The undertheorized power of the immigration bureaucracy
begins with a discussion of two mechanisms for innovation within the
immigration arena. First, frontline immigration bureaucrats have
been delegated the executive’s discretionary law-enforcement power,
49
which they can put toward creative ends; second, multiple and
overlapping agencies often possess jurisdiction over the same
immigration issues. Although frontline discretion and overlapping
agency jurisdiction are not entirely unique to immigration—they can
50
be found in areas as disparate as environmental law, criminal
51
52
53
enforcement, corporate governance, and national security —the

47. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 116.
48. CORNELL G. HOOTON, EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE 5–6 (1997) (“[C]areer officials . . .
are the people who most directly interpret, administer, and embody policies on a day-to-day
basis, who determine in large part the policy alternatives that are immediately available to
presidential appointees, and who provide continuity of government from one set of political
executives to the next.”).
49. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All
Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel 3 (June 17, 2011)
[hereinafter Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion] (stating that “[p]rosecutorial
discretion in civil immigration enforcement matters . . . may be exercised, with appropriate
supervisory oversight, by [a range of] ICE employees according to their specific responsibilities
and authorities”); id. (“ICE attorneys may exercise prosecutorial discretion in any immigration
removal proceeding before [the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)], on referral
of the case from EOIR to the Attorney General, or during the pendency of an appeal to the
federal courts, including a proceeding proposed or initiated by CBP or USCIS.”).
50. Todd Aagaard has examined overlaps between the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), noting in particular
the “significant regulatory overlap between the two agencies with respect to occupational risks
that arise from workplace exposure to contamination.” Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap,
Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 242 (2011); see
id. (“OSHA regulates pursuant to its authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
whereas the EPA regulates occupational risks pursuant to various environmental statutes.”).
51. See generally Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977) (noting ways that the overlap between
state and federal courts helped to advance the development of constitutional criminal
procedure).
52. Robert Ahdieh has examined overlap between the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and other regulatory bodies. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation,
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immigration arena illustrates ways that internal separation of powers
can produce a dialogue between experts at the highest and lowest
echelons of the executive branch.
A. Separation of Powers in Immigration Law
The first feature of bottom-up innovation concerns the ability of
frontline officers to exercise prosecutorial discretion—the authority
to decide whether and to what extent to enforce the law against
54
55
someone. Under current resource constraints, prosecutorial
discretion is a critically important tool in immigration enforcement,
and it is used in a wide variety of contexts. As scholars have noted,
the term “prosecutorial discretion” is actually a slight misnomer
because the power is broader than its name implies; prosecutorial
38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 865–66, 875, 923 (2006) (discussing the benefits of overlapping
enforcement jurisdictions between the SEC and New York Attorney General’s office); id. at 879
(“[T]he SEC is increasingly less and less alone in its regulatory pursuits. Rather, its jurisdiction
increasingly overlaps with that of its subnational, foreign, and transnational counterparts.”). Jill
Fisch has also noted ways that federal and state officials compete to regulate corporate
governance. See Jill E. Fisch, Institutional Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on
Macey, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 617, 619–23 (2005).
53. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 2324.
54. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49 at 2 (defining
prosecutorial discretion as the decision “not to assert the full scope of the enforcement authority
available to the agency in a given case”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE FACT SHEET ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION GUIDELINES
(2000) (“Prosecutorial discretion is the authority that every law enforcement agency has to
decide whether to exercise its enforcement powers against someone.”); Memorandum from Bo
Cooper, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., to Comm’r, Immigration &
Naturalization Servs. 3 (July 11, 2000), http://shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretiomemo
cooper.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3TZ-NFZ5] (“Because . . . the INS does not have the resources
fully and completely to enforce the immigration laws against every violator, it exercises
prosecutorial discretion thousands of times every day . . . . [T]he removal of criminal aliens and
the deterrence of alien smuggling, are examples of discretionary enforcement decisions.”);
Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., to Reg’l
Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, Reg’l and Dist. Counsel 1 (Nov. 17, 2000) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (“Service officers are not only authorized by law but expected to
exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement process.”).
55. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) [hereinafter Wadhia, Sharing
Secrets] (“According to the agency’s own statistics, [the government] has the resources to
remove less than 4% of the total undocumented population.”); see also The Dep’t of Homeland
Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the U.S & to Defer
Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 9 (2014) [hereinafter OLC Opinion], http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F4ZC-8UQW] (noting “striking” resource constraints and “the practical reality
that the number of aliens who are removable under the INA vastly exceeds the resources
Congress has made available to DHS for processing and carrying out removals”).
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discretion encompasses a broad spectrum of discretionary
enforcement decisions well beyond those made during an
immigration proceeding or by a prosecuting attorney. For example, it
includes prioritizing certain conduct or offenses for enforcement;
deciding whom to stop, question, and arrest; deciding to detain and
charge an individual, or to release the individual on bond, and the
conditions of such release; granting deferred action, stays of removal
orders, parole, voluntary departure, or other actions in lieu of
removing a noncitizen; deciding whether to pursue an appeal; and
56
executing a removal order.
1. Prosecutorial Discretion. Executive enforcement power in
immigration rests with the president, the attorney general, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and three of DHS’s
enforcement subagencies—Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
57
and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Prosecutorial discretion
provides important flexibility in cases where the costs of deportation
58
far outweigh the benefits, and frontline officers have been delegated
the power to grant favorable exercises of discretion on a case-by-case

56. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 2–3; see also Wadhia,
Great FOIA Adventure, supra note 32, at 346 (“There are at least 25 different forms of
prosecutorial discretion that DHS may employ to protect a noncitizen from removal including:
not bringing removal charges against a noncitizen, not arresting or detaining a noncitizen, and
granting parole to a noncitizen.”).
57. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9
CONN. PUB. INT’L L.J. 243, 257 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion]; Kelly
Mannion, Note, International Law, Federal Courts, and Executive Discretion: The Interplay in
Immigration Detention, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1217, 1232 (2013).
58. See Executive Immigration Enforcement Limitations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration Policy and Enforcement and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10–11
(2011) [hereinafter Immigration Enforcement Limitations Hearing] (statement of Prof. Margaret
D. Stock), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Stock07262011.pdf [http://perma.cc/
QW4D-NVC9]. In that hearing Margaret D. Stock stated,
The costs of deporting someone are substantial; deportation costs include the
expenses of arrest, detention, hearings, and physical removal. Congress has not
provided the Department of Homeland Security with the funding or resources to
deport every immigration law violator. When faced with a choice of allocating limited
enforcement dollars between, for example, undocumented aliens engaged in criminal
activities and individuals who were brought to this country illegally as young children
through no fault of their own, who have subsequently succeeded in school, and who
now enjoy, extensive community (and often Congressional delegation support) for
their remaining in the country, DHS has reasonably prioritized enforcement action
against the undocumented aliens engaged in criminal activity.
Id.
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basis to advance a number of humanitarian goals. As discussed
below, there are other, nonprosecutorial immigration personnel who
also possess discretion, and exercise it, to produce bottom-up
60
influences on agency higher-ups.
2. Agency Redundancies. A second attribute of immigration
innovation concerns overlapping authority across various subagencies
that exercise enforcement discretion, creating novel opportunities for
dialogue and enhancing the potential for different actors—with their
respective interests, perspectives, and pedigrees—to influence agency
policy. Overlapping agency structures within DHS and DOJ bring
enhanced checks and balances that deepen the possibilities for
61
dialogue and debate.
Officers within three different DHS subagencies have a role in
prosecutorial discretion. First are the DHS trial attorneys within
ICE—prosecutors who appear before immigration judges and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and who can exercise
discretion by making recommendations to administratively close
62
removal cases. ICE also houses a contingent of ground-level officers
on the frontline of enforcement who are often the last resort for
63
foreign nationals seeking to avoid the execution of a removal order.
Second are benefits administrators within USCIS, the subagency
charged with adjudicating nonadversarial affirmative petitions and
64
applications, who can also exercise prosecutorial discretion by
59. See infra Part II.B.
60. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
61. See Katyal, supra note 6. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 abolished the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and divided its responsibilities among the newly
created DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ). Under the Homeland Security Act, the
adversarial adjudicatory functions of immigration courts and the BIA are housed within DOJ
and overseen by the Attorney General. The prosecutorial and enforcement functions, as well as
the nonadversarial adjudicatory functions, are housed within DHS and are overseen by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 275, 291, 521 (2012); Margaret H. Taylor,
Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in
Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 483–84 (2007).
62. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.
dhs.gov/office-general-counsel [http://perma.cc/RG6A-NHZV].
63. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS (2011), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/
tool-kit-for-prosecutors%20v.2%20linked%2005.02.11.pdf [http://perma.cc/VM32-46JF]; see
also Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/
overview [http://perma.cc/S3PK-ZJ85].
64. A leading example is the marriage-based adjustment of status application—the process
by which an eligible individual already in the United States can obtain permanent resident
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holding cases in abeyance or granting deferred action. Third are
officers within CBP, who handle border-related enforcement actions,
such as border patrol and airport inspections, and who can exercise
discretion regarding whether or not to bring truncated, or so-called
expedited, removal proceedings for those caught attempting to enter
66
the United States.
Other, nonprosecutorial immigration officers (within other
agencies) also possess important discretionary authority that can
contribute to executive branch experimentation. Officers within the
Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR)—including the BIA and the complement of immigration
67
judges who decide removal cases, as well as the attorney general,
who oversees the BIA—possess numerous discretionary powers
ranging from granting continuances to administratively closing cases.
Additionally, officers within the Department of State have the
68
discretion to grant visas. As the following case studies indicate, these
nonprosecutorial officers can bring to bear important
considerations—based in humanitarian concerns and resource
constraints—that DHS officers consider when granting favorable
exercises of prosecutorial discretion.
Owing to these overlapping institutions at both the agency and
subagency level, oftentimes more than one (sub)agency possesses
authority over the same immigration issue, subject matter, or foreign
69
national. Consequently, foreign nationals interfacing with the
status without having to return to his or her country of origin to complete immigrant visa
processing. See Adjustment of Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/adjustment-status
[http://perma.cc/X22C-6X2Q].
65. Visa Retrogression, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.
uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/visa-availability-priority-dates/visaretrogression [http://perma.cc/KP4L-ACLQ] (last updated June 14, 2011).
66. See About CBP, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., http://www.cbp.gov/about [http://perma.
cc/JF4N-BE89]. Those proceedings, as well as CBP’s exercise of discretion, are beyond the
scope of this Article.
67. The EOIR is composed of immigration courts, the Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge, and the BIA, which hears appeals of most immigration decisions. This bifurcated system
of immigration functions is described supra at note 61.
68. See Ineligibilities and Waivers: Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/general/ineligibilities.html [http://perma.cc/AP
R7-NFXL].
69. See Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J.
2512, 2548 (2014) (noting that the creation of DHS in 2002 divided “[r]esponsibility for asylum
administration” such that “DHS now has jurisdiction over affirmative asylum applications in the
first instance, but . . . a DOJ component[] adjudicates the de novo review of [denied]
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immigration system often come into contact with multiple
(sub)agencies with the power to grant or deny relief. Such
jurisdictional overlap can allow novel policy experiments to emerge
within various subagencies that filter up to higher authorities within
the executive branch. Thus, differing institutional responses of
frontline officers within distinct agencies and subagencies, and the
conflicts they create, can generate fruitful arenas for experimentation
and policy innovation.
B. The Evolution of Frontline Discretion
For nearly five decades, agency memoranda have directed
frontline officers to grant favorable exercises of discretion, based on
an array of factors, in immigration enforcement. The bases for
discretion have changed over the years, but they generally have been
articulated through flexible and open-ended frameworks, leaving
room for innovation in an officer’s daily decisionmaking. For
example, one particular prosecutorial discretion memorandum—in
place between June 2011 and November 2014—listed nearly twenty
different factors relevant to a potential favorable exercise of
70
discretion. Even the earliest memoranda on record contemplated a
applications . . . as well as asylum claims raised defensively in removal proceedings”); see also
Aliens and Nationality; Homeland Security; Reorganization of Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 9,824,
9,825 (Feb. 28, 2003) (describing the jurisdiction and regulation overlap between INS and
EOIR); Retrospective Regulatory Review Under E.O. 13563, 77 Fed. Reg. 59,567, 59,568–69
(Sept. 28, 2012) (same).
70. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 4. Morton listed the
following factors as relevant to a favorable exercise of discretion:
the agency’s civil immigration enforcement priorities; the person’s length of presence
in the United States, with particular consideration given to presence while in lawful
status; the circumstances of the person’s arrival in the United States and the manner
of his or her entry, particularly if the alien came to the United States as a young child;
the person’s pursuit of education in the United States, with particular consideration
given to those who have graduated from a U.S. high school or have successfully
pursued or are pursuing a college or advanced degrees at a legitimate institution of
higher education in the United States; whether the person, or the person’s immediate
relative, has served in the U.S. military, reserves, or national guard, with particular
consideration given to those who served in combat; the person’s criminal history,
including arrests, prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants; the person’s
immigration history, including any prior removal, outstanding order of removal, prior
denial of status, or evidence of fraud; whether the person poses a national security or
public safety concern; the person’s ties and contributions to the community, including
family relationships; the person’s ties to the home country and conditions in the
country; the person’s age, with particular consideration given to minors and the
elderly; whether the person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or
parent; whether the person is the primary caretaker of a person with a mental or
physical disability, minor, or seriously ill relative; whether the person or the person’s
spouse is pregnant or nursing; whether the person or the person’s spouse suffers from
severe mental or physical illness; whether the person’s nationality renders removal
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fairly wide range of scenarios supporting favorable exercises of
71
discretion. An internal agency “Operations Instruction” from 1975
directed that officers consider
(1) advanced or tender age; (2) many years’ presence in the United
States; (3) physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment
in the United States; (4) family situation in the United States—effect
of expulsion; [and] (5) criminal, immoral or subversive activities or
72
affiliations.

Frontline discretion became increasingly significant in the wake
of 1996 legislation that drastically limited statutory relief from
removal, rendering increased numbers of cases ineligible for
73
immigration relief. As a response, individual members of Congress
74
pressured the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
to make more expansive use of prosecutorial discretion in
75
sympathetic cases. In 1999, twenty-eight members of the House of
Representatives, including Congressman Lamar Smith, the principal
author of the 1996 legislation, wrote a letter to Attorney General
Janet Reno and INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, requesting the
76
adoption of prosecutorial discretion in meritorious cases.
unlikely; whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or
other relief from removal, including as a relative of a U.S. citizen or permanent
resident; whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or
other relief from removal, including as an asylum seeker, or a victim of domestic
violence, human trafficking, or other crime; and whether the person is currently
cooperating or has cooperated with federal, state or local law enforcement
authorities.
Id.
71. (LEGACY) IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS
INSTRUCTIONS, OI § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975); see Wadhia, supra note 2, at 187–88 n.8.
72. Id.
73. See T.A. ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN
FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 780 (7th ed. 2012);
Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 252–55 (describing the Cooper
memorandum written in response to the 1996 immigration reforms).
74. The abolishment of INS and its transfer of functions across DOJ and DHS are
described supra at note 61.
75. See Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 252–53; Anthony Lewis,
Opinion, Abroad at Home: The Mills of Cruelty, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 1999), http://www.
nytimes.com/1999/12/14/opinion/abroad-at-home-the-mills-of-cruelty.html
[http://perma.cc/95
82-LBVP]; Mirta Ojito, Immigrant Fights Off His Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/04/nyregion/immigrant-fights-off-his-deportation.html [http://
perma.cc/NCH9-DE68].
76. Letter from Rep. Henry J. Hyde et al. to Janet Reno, Att’y Gen., and Doris Meissner,
Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., on Guidelines for Use of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Removal Proceedings (Nov. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Hyde Letter], http://www.ice.
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Subsequently, at the behest of Meissner, INS General Counsel Bo
Cooper outlined the legal basis and limitations of the agency’s
77
discretionary powers, which Meissner used as the foundation for
published guidance on the principles underlying prosecutorial
78
discretion and the bases on which it could be favorably exercised.
Importantly, Meissner instructed INS personnel to consider the
totality of the circumstances of a given case, greatly expanding the
opportunities for frontline officers to grant favorable exercises of
79
discretion.
80
When INS was abolished in 2003, the entities that absorbed its
functions—USCIS, ICE, and CBP, all within DHS—followed the
same guidance for exercising favorable discretion. In 2005, William
Howard, the head of the office charged with prosecuting all removal
proceedings, issued a memorandum to all chief counsel describing the
specific types of cases in which favorable exercises of discretion
should be granted and concluding that “the universe of opportunities
81
to exercise prosecutorial discretion is large.” Likewise, in 2007,
Assistant Secretary of ICE Julie Myers released guidance on the
effect of discretionary enforcement authority on arrests and detention
82
practices against nursing mothers. Myers incorporated the Meissner
gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/991104congress-letter.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PP7P-GR
G2]. The letter conceded that “[t]here has been widespread agreement that some deportations
were unfair and resulted in unjustifiable hardships.” Id. at 1.
77. Memorandum from Bo Cooper, supra note 54, at 4–7.
78. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 54, at 7–9. The memorandum provided
a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered when deciding whether to favorably exercise
discretion, including (1) the immigration status of the noncitizen, (2) the length of time spent
living in the United States, (3) the humanitarian concerns contained in the INS Operations
Instructions, (4) whether a criminal history exists, and (5) whether there was a history of
immigration violations. Id. at 7–8. Other factors included (6) the likelihood of ultimately
removing the noncitizen, (7) the likelihood of achieving the enforcement goals by other means,
(8) whether the noncitizen is eligible for other relief, or is likely to become so, (9) the effect of
an enforcement action on future admissibility, (10) any current or past cooperation with law
enforcement, (11) honorable U.S. military service, (12) community attention to the issue,
including public opinion and publicity, and (13) the resources of the agency. Id.
79. Id. at 8.
80. See Noël L. Griswold, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the Department of
Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 207, 221 (2006); Wadhia,
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 257.
81. Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enf’t, to All OPLA Chief Counsel 2 (Oct. 24, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
82. Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
to All Field Office Dirs. and All Special Agents in Charge (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
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memorandum by reference, reminding ICE personnel of the agency’s
responsibility “to use discretion in identifying and responding to
83
meritorious health related cases and caregiver issues.”
Under more recent memoranda, the factors underlying
prosecutorial discretion have been further expanded. In 2010, ICE
Director John Morton issued a pair of influential memoranda that
84
identified the agency’s enforcement priorities and reemphasized the
broad availability of favorable exercises of discretion by officers,
85
The memorandum on
agents, and attorneys within ICE.
prosecutorial discretion provided nineteen factors that ICE
employees could consider when deciding whether to favorably
exercise prosecutorial discretion in a given case.
In 2012 and 2014, the Obama administration unveiled across-theboard prosecutorial discretion programs for foreign nationals who
86
came to the United States as children (DACA) and for the foreign87
national parents of U.S.-citizen and LPR children (DAPA).
Contemporaneous with the 2014 prosecutorial discretion initiative,
88
the Obama administration modified its enforcement policies,
89
outlining three priority enforcement categories while retaining the
83. Id.
84. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
to All ICE Emps. (June 30, 2010) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). This memorandum listed
three categories of enforcement priorities—those posing a threat to national security or public
safety, recent arrivals, and immigration fugitives. Id. at 1–3. Removal of immigrants that did not
fall into these categories was deemphasized. MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KRISTEN MCCABE,
MIGRATION POLICY INST., DEPORTATION AND DISCRETION: REVIEWING THE RECORD AND
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 3 (Oct. 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-anddiscretion-reviewing-record-and-options-change [http://perma.cc/U9RQ-EDJ2].
85. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 1, 3–4. Morton
amplified the role of ICE attorneys by empowering them to review the charging decisions of
ICE, CBP, and USCIS at any stage in the removal process. Id.
86. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
88. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t et al. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M4AF-PD9P].
89. See id. at 3–4. The first priority includes those immigrants who pose a threat to national
security, border security, or public safety, including those arrested at the border while trying to
illegally enter the United States, those convicted of non-immigration-related felonies, and those
convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. at 3. The second priority includes those convicted of three
or more non-immigration-related misdemeanor offenses (other than minor traffic offenses),
those who have been convicted of a “significant” misdemeanor, those who have not been
continuously present in the United States since January 1, 2014, and those who have
“significantly abused the visa or visa waiver programs.” Id. at 3–4. The third priority includes
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open-ended language of prior memoranda directing officers to grant
90
favorable exercises of discretion in meritorious cases.
III. IMMIGRATION AS A LABORATORY FOR EXECUTIVE
EXPERIMENTATION
In the case studies that follow, frontline officers placed their
discretion at the vanguard of policy innovation by addressing certain
immigration problems that higher-level officials could not or would
not resolve. In some cases, a groundswell of favorable exercises of
discretion later became reflected in across-the-board policies set by
officials within the highest echelons of government. Though these
case studies do not provide empirical proof that decisionmaking on
the ground actually produced across-the-board change—the evidence
is correlative, not causal—the case studies illustrate how lower-level
enforcement decisions that converge around various policy solutions
could be a basis for across-the-board policy. At a minimum, agency
higher-ups should look to case-by-case exercises of discretion as a
resource for generating information and new ideas.

those who received a final order of removal on or after January 1, 2014. Id. at 4. Although the
three categories of enforcement priorities are reminiscent of those identified in the 2010 Morton
memorandum, the 2014 memorandum differs in three significant respects: First, the more recent
memorandum lowers the priority for immigrants convicted of misdemeanors and provides more
detail regarding the types of misdemeanors that make an immigrant an enforcement priority.
WILLIAM A. KANDEL, JEROME P. BJELOPERA, ANDORRA BRUNO & ALISON SISKIN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE PRESIDENT’S IMMIGRATION ACCOUNTABILITY EXECUTIVE ACTION
OF NOVEMBER 20, 2014: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 10 (Feb. 24, 2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/home
sec/R43852.pdf [http://perma.cc/HM68-E6ZY]; Legislative Update: 11/24/2014, FED’N FOR AM.
IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/legislative-updates/legislative-update-11-24-2014
[http://perma.cc/M6WC-9AAR]. Second, the 2014 memorandum increases the priority level of
immigrants arrested at the border while trying to unlawfully enter the United States. KANDEL
ET AL., supra, at 10. Finally, those immigrants who were issued a final order of removal before
January 2014 are no longer an enforcement priority, provided they do not pose a criminal or
national-safety concern. Id. at 9.
90. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 88, at 6 (instructing DHS
personnel to consider factors such as “extenuating circumstances involving the offense of
conviction; extended length of time since the offense of conviction; length of time in the United
States; military service; family or community ties in the United States; status as a victim, witness
or plaintiff in civil or criminal proceedings; or compelling humanitarian factors such as poor
health, age, pregnancy, a young child, or a seriously ill relative”); id. (“These factors are not
intended to be dispositive nor is this list intended to be exhaustive. Decisions should be based
on the totality of the circumstances.”).
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A. Caveats Regarding Ground-Level Discretion
Before proceeding, a few caveats are in order. First, this more
optimistic side of bureaucratic discretion cannot erase the numerous
accounts in which agents have refused to grant favorable exercises of
91
discretion in the most obvious and deserving cases. Indeed, during
the past several years, many frontline officers have either refused to
grant favorable exercises of discretion even in categories of cases
92
designated as a low priority under policy memoranda, or challenged
93
those memoranda wholesale by suing the government. To be sure,
on-the-ground experiments require supervision by policy officials who
have the bigger picture in mind, and the concept of bottom-up
experimentation should not be decoupled from strong presidential
leadership: in theory, lower-level experimentation and higher-level
oversight work in tandem to move immigration law forward. But
bottom-up experimentation, combined with top-down controls, could
provide better mechanisms for a kind of dialogue that can lead to
better policy learning and outcomes—a point that some at the highest
94
levels of immigration policy have explicitly endorsed. Thus, it is

91. See Stephen Dinan, Dysfunctional Immigration Enforcement System Tears Apart
Family, WASH. TIMES (May 13, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/13/
immigration-enforcement-system-dysfunction-tears-a/?page=all [http://perma.cc/4CPZ-GRKZ];
Holly Hines, Attorney: Pastor Max Villatoro Deported: ‘No Easy Way’ to Get U.S. Visa, IOWA
CITY PRESS-CITIZEN (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.press-citizen.com/story/news/local/2015/03/20/
villatoro-deported/25092073 [http://perma.cc/PQ7S-K3RY].
92. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 187–88 (noting resistance by bureaucratic
officers to grant favorable exercises of discretion as spelled out in top-down enforcement
directives and “routinely ignoring individual requests for deferred action”); Kagan, supra note 9,
at 678–79 (noting frustration by “immigration activists who complained that sympathetic
immigrants were still being placed into removal proceedings”); Julia Preston, Deportations
Under New U.S. Policy are Inconsistent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, at A16 (noting uneven
application of “administration policy to avoid deportations of illegal immigrants who are not
criminals”); Terry Greene Sterling, Immigration Lawyers Say Enforcement of Deportation
Memo Falls Short, THE DAILY BEAST (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2011/11/19/immigration-lawyers-say-enforcement-of-deportation-memo-falls-short.html [http://
perma.cc/W9FA-R3AU].
93. See, e.g., Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that five officers
within ICE did not have standing to sue the Obama administration over its 2012 DACA policy,
despite the claim that the policy prevented them from carrying out a statutory obligation to
enforce the nation’s immigration law and deport all undocumented foreign nationals). The
plaintiff states in Texas v. United States have had more success. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
94. Indeed, some at the higher echelons of policymaking have shown an interest in
adapting based on the involvement of a broader range of stakeholders. Deputy Secretary of
Homeland Security, Director Alejandro Mayorkas, announced at the American Immigration
Lawyers Association conference in June 2014,
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worth considering how to tap into the power of bureaucratic ranks for
the potential benefits career officers can bring to the development of
agency law and policy.
To be sure, the decision by a presidential administration to take
categorical action can result from a range of inputs—including the
president, Congress, the federal courts, the media, and especially the
95
immigration bar—that coalesce over time. And some of the
innovation identified in this Article includes the work of advocates
who, in conjunction with bureaucratic officers, found new solutions to
immigration inequities. Nevertheless, many categorical executive
branch policies emerged in the wake of a groundswell of frontline
enforcement decisions—suggesting possible links between case-bycase enforcement and across-the-board agency action.
Although it may be easy to distinguish between top-down and
bottom-up decisionmaking in certain cases, the distinction is not
always obvious. Clearly, a directive from the president is top-down,
while decisions initiated by frontline officers are bottom-up. For
purposes of this Article, I will treat as top-down all measures taken by
the president, cabinet members, undersecretaries, and policy officials
that include midlevel personnel—all of which are directed downward
to agents in the field. Meanwhile, bottom-up influencers are those
field agents, frontline officers, or other members of the lower
bureaucratic ranks who implement the law on a day-to-day basis, and
who exercise discretion based on guidance articulated through policy
96
memoranda. The point of drawing the distinction is not for the sake
of a hard-and-fast rule about where various agency actors fall within a
chain of command, but rather to understand an iterative and dialogic
It is my plan to have ICE and CBP engage with you fully in the spirit of openness and
transparency that are the hallmarks of good government and significantly in the
service of justice . . . [and] collaboration. As individuals, groups, organizations or
otherwise, we are stakeholders with a shared interest in the success of the immigrant
experience in America. To that end, we must be open with one another, exchange
ideas, advocate, agree or disagree, and ultimately work together to realize the
promise of whatever decisions we make.
Alejandro Mayorkas, Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Keynote Address at the
American Immigration Lawyers Association Conference (July 2, 2014), http://www.aila.org/
publications/videos/aila-events-and-highlights/video-deputy-secretary-of-homeland-security
[http://perma.cc/3DMB-TFMP].
95. When immigration advocates seek change, they generally launch a multifront campaign
that includes Congress, the White House, the courts, and the press. See infra Part III.B.
96. Immigration law may be somewhat unusual given that many ground-level officers
throughout the various immigration subagencies arguably have, by virtue of their lawenforcement discretion, an enhanced power that similarly situated officers within other agencies
generally lack.
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process between lower-level immigration officers and the higher
ranks that, rather than predicated on a strict dichotomy, is a part of a
larger and more fluid evolutionary process of policymaking.
B. Immigration Innovation in Action
The following four case studies highlight a number of different
contexts in which frontline officers have put their enforcement
discretion to creative uses. On certain occasions, immigration
bureaucrats solved an immigration-law problem or conundrum that
higher-level administrative officials refused to address categorically.
On others, the lower-level bureaucracy resisted top-down
immigration policies that were greatly out of step with the agency’s
long-term interests and best practices. The case studies span (1)
deportation relief for LGBT foreign nationals in relationships with
U.S. citizens and LPRs, (2) the granting of parole in place for the
immediate family members of U.S. citizen service members, (3)
efforts to protect victims of gender-motivated persecution under
domestic asylum law, and (4) bureaucratic resistance to policies that
required automatic detention of foreign nationals ordered removed.
Together, they highlight different ways that frontline discretion can
constitute an important locus of subfederal policymaking, with
tremendous potential for higher-level learning, innovation, and
adaptation.
1. LGBT Immigrants in Binational Relationships. The first case
study involves discrimination against gay and lesbian foreign
nationals in relationships with U.S. citizens and LPRs, an issue that
predates laws like the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which, for
97
years, refused federal recognition to valid same-sex marriages. Long
before the Supreme Court invalidated DOMA in United States v.
98
Windsor and upheld the constitutional right of same-sex couples to
99
marry in Obergefell v. Hodges, frontline officers within the various
arms of the executive branch used their discretionary power to
provide a reprieve to same-sex couples who faced separation because
the law prevented them from seeking family-based immigration
benefits. Although there was no basis for the foreign national to

97. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated in part by
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
98. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
99. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
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obtain immigrant status, exercises of discretion on the ground allowed
100
These
families to remain together within the United States.
favorable exercises of discretion occurred one at a time, without any
guidance from higher-ups; eventually, after a groundswell of similar,
case-by-case decisions by ground-level officers across DHS and DOJ,
the Obama administration took across-the-board action by directing
favorable exercises of discretion in all similarly situated cases
involving binational same-sex couples.
The first reported case of a binational same-sex couple involved
Richard Adams, a U.S. citizen, and Anthony Sullivan, a citizen of
Australia, who secured a marriage license in 1975 from a County
101
Clerk in Boulder, Colorado. Marriage license in hand, Adams
sponsored Sullivan for permanent residency as his “immediate
relative” so that Sullivan could apply to adjust his status to that of an
102
LPR. Legacy INS denied the petition because the couple “failed to
establish that a bona fide marital relationship can exist between two
103
104
faggots.” The Ninth Circuit upheld that decision in 1982.
Adams and Sullivan’s treatment by legacy INS is one in a long
history of especially unkind and humiliating experiences suffered by
LGBT immigrants and binational couples, which included a longtime
105
ban on gay and lesbian entrants. The elimination of that ban in 1990

100. Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal
Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 629–43 (2012).
101. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1036,
1038 (9th Cir. 1982). In many ways, the Adams/Sullivan marriage was an instance of frontline
innovation by both the Colorado clerk, Clela Rorex, who issued the license, and the county
attorney, who concluded that Colorado law did not preclude granting marriage licenses to samesex couples. Robert Barnes, 40 Years Later, Story of a Same-Sex Marriage in Colo. Remains
Remarkable, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/
40-years-later-a-same-sex-marriage-in-colorado-remains-remarkable/2015/04/18/e65852d0-e2d411e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html [https://perma.cc/ERC8-NQHZ]. Rorex was eventually
barred from issuing licenses when then-Colorado Attorney General J.D. MacFarlane issued a
contrary legal opinion. John Aguilar, Boulder County Begins Issuing Same-Sex Marriage
Licenses; AG Says No, DENVER POST (June 25, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/
news/ci_26033269/boulder-county-clerk-begins-issuing-same-sex-marriage [http://perma.cc/U3
65-FLG8].
102. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1120.
103. See Barnes, supra note 101. The Obama administration issued an apology to Sullivan in
2015 for “the disrespect shown toward you and Mr. Adams.” Id.
104. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038.
105. In 1952, Congress barred entry to noncitizens suffering from “psychopathic personality,
epilepsy, or a mental defect.” Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(4),
66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) (repealed 1990). Although that phrase did not necessarily contemplate a
homosexuality-based exclusion, the Supreme Court interpreted it as such in Boutilier v. INS, 387
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did not improve the lot of many same-sex binational couples, who
continued to suffer under the weight of discriminatory marriage laws
that prevented them from staying together in the United States.
Whereas foreign nationals routinely obtain permanent residency
106
through marriage to a U.S. citizen, for decades the LGBT foreignnational partners and spouses of U.S. citizens lacked access to that
common immigration benefit—the problem facing Adams and
107
Sullivan, and one that persisted until only very recently.
Even as the federal government began to recognize same-sex
relationships for certain, limited positive immigration treatment in the
108
1990s, LGBT immigrants facing separation from their U.S.-citizen
or LPR partners still had to appeal to frontline officers to avoid

U.S. 118, 122–25 (1967) (applying the statute to the case of a gay man). Congress later
reinforced the exclusion of gays and lesbians by amending the immigration statute to exclude
those with a “sexual deviation.” Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911,
919. Congress did not repeal the bar on gays and lesbians from entering the country until 1990.
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (amending
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
106. Spousal immigration (in which a U.S. citizen or LPR sponsors a noncitizen for
immigration benefits) accounts for 25 percent of all LPR flow annually. RANDALL MONGER &
JAMES YANKAY, DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2013,
ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, at 3 tbl.2 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
ois_lpr_fr_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/8YJR-FDUG]; Cori K. Garland, Note, Say “I Do”: The
Judicial Duty to Heighten Constitutional Scrutiny of Immigration Policies Affecting Same-Sex
Binational Couples, 84 IND. L.J. 689, 702 (2009).
107. In the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (guaranteeing the freedom
of same-sex couples to marry, see supra note 99 and accompanying text), and United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act); see supra note 98
and accompanying text, the foreign-national spouses of same-sex couples can access all familybased immigration benefits, including adjustment of status through marriage.
108. In 1993, the Department of State recognized the importance of allowing
“nonimmigrant” foreign nationals (those coming to the United States temporarily for a specific
purpose, such as a foreign-government official, student, or temporary worker) to bring same-sex
spouses or partners with them. See B-2 Visa Available for Non-Spouse, Same-Sex Partner of L-1,
INS Says, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 421, 422 (Mar. 29, 1993); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 41.31, N14.4 (2002); Telegram from Colin Powell, Sec’y of State,
Dep’t. of State, to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, on B-2 Classification for Cohabitating
Partners (July 1, 2001). Under this policy, the same-sex partners of nonimmigrants could apply
for a visitor’s visa to accompany their partner to the United States. The policy remained in
effect for nearly two decades, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, and was
expanded in 2011 when the Obama administration issued guidance to make it easier to extend
the partner’s status. See Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Security, Changes to B-2 Status and Extensions of B-2 Status for
Cohabitating Partners and Other Nonimmigrant Household Members (Aug. 17, 2011), http://
www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2011/August/Cohabitating_Partners_PM_081711.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6378-7ZKM] (directing officers to consider a nonimmigrant’s cohabitating
partnership as a “favorable factor” when granting extensions of the visitor’s status).
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separation. And as the issue of same-sex marriage began to gain
traction nationwide, higher-level officials remained silent on the
injustice of separating gay and lesbian binational couples. For years,
progress occurred one case at a time—via frontline officer discretion.
During the mid-to-late 2000s, as a growing number of gay and
lesbian couples obtained marriage licenses in various domestic and
foreign jurisdictions, immigration officers throughout both DHS and
DOJ exercised discretion to spare LGBT foreign nationals with U.S.citizen or LPR partners and spouses some of the harshest
109
consequences of the contemporaneous state of the law. Section 3 of
the Defense of Marriage Act—which remained on the books until the
2013 Windsor decision—prevented gay and lesbian U.S. citizens and
LPRs from sponsoring their foreign-national spouses for family-based
110
immigration benefits, including (but not limited to) spousal benefits,
111
resulting in the couple’s separation. For couples with children, an
inability to marry or have a valid marriage respected by the federal
government meant additional complications.
Case-by-case favorable exercises of discretion occurred in a
number of different ways. In some cases, DHS prosecutors took the
112
initiative by moving to administratively close cases that were

109. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
110. See Landau, supra note 100, at 630–31 & nn.39–43. In addition to spousal immigration,
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for a number of other family-based
immigration benefits, all of which were unavailable during this time to the foreign-national
spouses and partners of LGBT U.S. citizens and LPRs. Id. These include visas for foreign –
based fiancé(e)s, waivers of bars to inadmissibility that prevent foreign-national spouses from
obtaining status as LPRs, and cancellation of removal—an important defense to removal—
which was unavailable to the foreign national unless he or she could claim the relief based on a
U.S.-citizen or LPR parent or child. Id.
111. Not only would individuals without another basis for lawful permanent residence be
required to leave the country (or possibly face removal proceedings), but if a foreign national
left the country after overstaying a visa or otherwise accruing unlawful presence within the
United States, he or she could face a lengthy bar from reentry into the United States as well. See
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2012) (making inadmissible any foreign national who “was
unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1
year . . . [who] again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien’s departure or
removal”); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (making inadmissible any foreign national who “has been
unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission
within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal”).
112. See, e.g., In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 692 (B.I.A. 2012). Administrative closure
removes a case from the immigration court’s or the BIA’s active docket, requiring either the
government or the respondent to the proceeding to move that the case be recalendared before
the judge (or reinstated before the BIA). See id. (explaining the result of an administrative
closure).
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113

pending before immigration judges. In other cases, immigration
judges granted continuances for unusually long periods—perhaps
with the expectation that the law would change in the near future
such that the foreign national could take advantage of newly available
114
benefits. And when neither option was available, or in some cases in
which the foreign national was not (yet) in removal proceedings,
foreign nationals would seek (and USCIS would grant) deferred
115
action. Although different subagencies took different kinds of
action, these various exercises of discretion ultimately coalesced
around a common set of outcomes—namely, preventing LGBT

113. See Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings Against Immigrant in Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A16 (noting a June 2011 case in which the government
moved to administratively close removal proceedings against a Venezuelan national living in
New Jersey with a U.S.-citizen husband); Michael Bowman, U.S. Immigration Judge Suspends
Deportation for Gay Spouse, VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/
content/usimmigration-judge-suspends-deportation-of-gay-spouse-118741179/174610.html
[http://perma.cc/9RT6-G68B] (noting a case in which the government filed a motion to
administratively close removal proceedings against an Argentine who lived in Queens, New
York, with her U.S. citizen wife); Chris Geidner, Immigration Judge Closes Deportation Case
Against Married Gay Man, METRO WEEKLY (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.metroweekly.com/
poliglot/2011/08/immigration-judge-closes-depor.html [http://perma.cc/V762-W2M3] (noting the
government’s motion to administratively close removal proceedings against a Venezuelan
national with a U.S.-citizen husband); Officials Agree to Close Deportation Case Involving Gay
Binational Couple, ADVOCATE (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2011/
12/16/officials-agree-close-deportation-case-involving-gay-binational-couple
[http://perma.cc/
2D5S-PMWZ] (noting a government motion to administratively close removal proceedings
against a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago with an American spouse in Massachusetts).
114. See Semple, supra note 113 (describing how DHS trial attorneys originally balked at a
favorable exercise of discretion, which prompted the immigration judge to grant adjournments
so that the agency could reconsider); see also Geidner, supra note 113 (noting how an
immigration judge postponed deciding a case for two years). In the face of government
opposition, immigration judges occasionally would order that the case be administratively
closed. See Landau, supra note 100, at 641 n.102 (describing a decision by an immigration judge
in Charlotte, North Carolina, to administratively close removal proceedings over DHS’s
opposition).
115. See Press Release, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Anthony John Makk and
Bradford Wells (Jan. 4, 2012), http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/pelosi-statement-onanthony-john-makk-and-bradford-wells [http://perma.cc/4MKC-YZ89] (reporting that USCIS
granted deferred action to an Australian foreign national with a U.S.-citizen partner after the
noncitizen spouse was denied permanent residence); see also Miranda Leitsinger, Gay Couples,
Where Spouse is a Foreigner, Sue Over DOMA, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://
usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/04/03/11004440-gay-couples-where-spouse-is-a-foreigner-sueover-doma?lite [http://perma.cc/6WVL-55QQ] (noting that the government provided a South
African national with a U.S.-citizen spouse a one-year grant of deferred action); John Yoo,
Deportation Threat Lifted for Lesbian Vt. Couple, FOX NEWS (Oct. 12 2012), http://www.fox
news.com/us/2012/05/22/deportation-threat-lifted-for-lesbian-vt-couple.html
[http://perma.cc/
FKM4-XCBU].
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foreign nationals from being separated from their U.S.-citizen or LPR
partners and spouses.
As these novel exercises of discretion by lower-level officers
began to take root, at least one higher-level official took similar
action. In 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder certified a case from
the BIA denying relief to a same-sex binational couple, vacated its
decision, and ordered the BIA to consider whether the foreign
national could seek deportation relief based on the harm of being
116
separated from his U.S.-citizen domestic partner. Although it
seemed clear under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that
the foreign national was statutorily ineligible for the requested form
of deportation relief in that case given that he was not a “spouse,
117
parent, or child” of a U.S. citizen or LPR, DHS moved to have the
case administratively closed on remand, sparing the foreign national
118
from being separated from his partner. Indeed, the attorney
119
general’s decision in that case, Matter of Dorman, precipitated a
wave of additional decisions in which lower-level officers granted
favorable exercises of discretion to foreign nationals in same-sex
120
relationships with U.S. citizens. Through a feedback loop spanning
both ground-level and high-level decisionmaking, actors throughout
the agency made clear that the lack of formal legal protections for the
foreign-national spouses of LGBT U.S. citizens and permanent
residents would not be a bar to some effective form of reprieve.
Eventually, the Obama administration took categorical action.
On October 5, 2012, it provided across-the-board protections for all
similarly situated same-sex foreign-national partners of U.S. citizens
and LPRs, directing officers to consider granting prosecutorial
121
discretion in such cases. After a wave of decisions by DHS

116. In re Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011).
117. The foreign national was seeking cancellation of removal, an important defense to
removal that is limited to those who can establish, inter alia, “that removal would result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1) (2012). Non-LPRs who are granted cancellation of removal obtain permanent
residency. See id.
118. Landau, supra note 100, at 640 n.92.
119. In re Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 485.
120. Email from Lavi Soloway, Immigration Attorney in Private Practice, to author (Nov. 4,
2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
121. Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and James
Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field Office Dirs., All
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attorneys, immigration judges, and benefits adjudicators within
USCIS—as well as the attorney general’s efforts in Dorman—the
agency eventually ensured that all similarly situated foreign nationals
would receive equal treatment and be spared separation from their
122
families in appropriate cases.
2. Parole in Place for Military Spouses. The next case study,
involving parole in place for the family members of U.S. service
members, demonstrates not only the vertical interplay between lowerand higher-level personnel, but also how actors across multiple
agencies can simultaneously create mechanisms for policy change.
123
Parole in place had for decades been used to benefit Cuban citizens,
and it more recently became a mechanism to prevent military family
members from facing separation. Like the binational couples context,
this case study shows how possibilities for policy learning are formed
not only in elite policy circles, but also through experiments forged on
the ground and at all levels within the bureaucracy.
U.S. citizens routinely sponsor certain family members for
124
permanent residency, but those individuals must generally have
been “inspected and admitted or paroled” upon entry to be eligible to
125
adjust their status in the United States. Family members who cannot
demonstrate proper inspection and admission (or parole) upon
entering the United States, and who do not qualify for adjustment

Chief Counsel, and All Special Agents in Charge (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.washingtonblade.
com/content/files/2012/10/9-Oct-12-PD-and-Family-Reltionships.pdf [http://perma.cc/R986-ZA
B6].
122. See Email from Lavi Soloway, supra note 120 (noting a wave of favorable exercises of
discretion to foreign nationals in binational same-sex couples prior to and after Dorman).
123. See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, to Regional Dirs., District Dirs., Chief
Patrol Agents, and Reg’l & Dist. Counsel (Apr. 19, 1999) (describing Cuban parole in place
policy), http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/Doris-Meissner-CAA-Memo.pdf [http://perma.
cc/RH73-Z8Z].
124. Parents, spouses, and children under age twenty-one (often including stepchildren) of
U.S. citizens are not subject to standard immigration quotas and are eligible to obtain lawful
permanent residence without being subjected to numerical limitations. See Immigration and
Naturalization Act § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (defining “immediate
relatives” as “the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States, except that, in
the case of parents, such citizens shall be at least 21 years of age”); id. § 1151(b)(1) (describing
those not subject to direct numerical limitations).
125. Id. § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Certain exceptions exist for asylees, Cubans, special
immigrant juveniles, Violence Against Women Act petitioners, grandfathered foreign nationals,
and some others. See Margaret D. Stock, A Path to Citizenship for Undocumented Military
Family Members, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, July 2012, at 1, 2–3; see also id. (explaining how
foreign nationals can prove proper entry without documentary proof).
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126

under certain narrow and special exceptions, confront the prospect
of having to leave the country and undergo consular processing
overseas. However, once these foreign nationals depart the United
States, they often face bars to entry based on the period of “unlawful
127
presence” accrued within the United States. That reentry bar
effectively prevents those foreign-national spouses from adjusting to
LPR status despite having an approved family-based petition.
This issue was particularly troublesome for members of the U.S.
Armed Services with undocumented spouses, who faced added stress
when deploying overseas. In one case—the first publicly reported
case of this kind—Army Specialist Alex Jimenez, a U.S. citizen,
attempted to sponsor his wife, Yaderlin Hiraldo, for lawful
permanent residence prior to disappearing when his unit was
128
ambushed in Iraq. Hiraldo, who had entered the United States
without inspection, was placed into removal proceedings and ordered
to leave the country and seek an immigrant visa overseas, which
would have triggered a ten-year reentry bar. When then-Senator John
Kerry became aware of the situation, he prevailed on DHS Secretary
Michael Chertoff to grant Hiraldo discretionary parole so that she
129
could obtain permanent residency without leaving the country, and
130
Chertoff agreed.
Although Chertoff’s action applied only to one case, the decision
131
to grant discretionary parole spawned widespread media attention
126. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Act § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (providing for
possible adjustment of status of those physically present in the United States if they have had a
petition for classification or application for labor certification submitted before April 30, 2001,
were present in the United States as of December 21, 2000, and pay a $1,000 penalty).
127. See Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B). As
explained supra at note 111, any foreign national who is unlawfully present in the United States
for a period of more than 180 days but less than one year is subject to a bar on admission for
three years from the date of departure or removal; if the foreign national is unlawfully present
for one year or more, that individual is subject to a bar on admission for ten years from the date
of departure or removal. See id.
128. See Stock, supra note 125, at 3.
129. Id. at 4. Unfortunately, Specialist Jimenez was later deemed killed in action. Id.
130. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff Agrees to Kerry’s Request to
Protect Wife of Missing Soldier, U.S. FED. NEWS SERV., June 21, 2007 (containing text of letter
from DHS Secretary Chertoff to Senator John Kerry, which described how Secretary Chertoff
had directed that “ICE will grant Ms. Hiraldo discretionary parole into the United States”).
131. See, e.g., Marcus Baram & David Schoetz, A Military Wife’s Rock and Hard Place,
ABC NEWS (June 20, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3297537 [http://
perma.cc/TJY9-3EYR]; G.I.’s Illegal Immigrant Wife Awarded Green Card, NBC NEWS (July 1,
2007, 4:58 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19536767/ns/us_news-life/t/gis-illegal-immigrantwife-awarded-green-card [perma.cc/G2T4-VMFY].
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and precipitated discretionary grants of parole in place by lower-level
132
officers in discrete cases. The interventions by Kerry and Chertoff
appeared to have cascading effects, leading to a host of follow-on
activity by frontline bureaucratic officers within “local USCIS
office[s] having jurisdiction over [a] service member’s residence or
133
place of duty.” For years, these case-by-case discretionary grants of
parole in place allowed military family members to adjust status to
become an LPR without having to leave the United States and
134
undergo consular processing.
Still, without formal guidance
directing across-the-board exercises of discretion, practitioners
reported variation and inconsistencies throughout various USCIS
135
offices.
By 2010, favorable exercises of discretion in these military cases
became an increasingly routine occurrence, with frontline officers
taking a variety of approaches—including joining motions to reopen
before immigration judges, granting deferred action, or deciding not
136
to initiate removal proceedings in the first place.
Secretary
Napolitano was therefore able to acknowledge that “DHS utilizes
parole and deferred action to minimize periods of family separation,
and to facilitate adjustment of status within the United States by
immigrants who are the spouses, parents and children of military
137
members.” Finally, in 2013, after years of case-by-case exercises of
enforcement discretion, DHS issued across-the-board guidance,
132. See Immigration Enforcement Limitations Hearing, supra note 58, at 4 (statement of
Prof. Margaret D. Stock); Stock, supra note 125, at 4; see also Julia Preston, Immigration Policy
Aims to Help Military Families, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/
us/01immig.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/878R-QUPX] (noting that officers provided reprieve for
military families “on a case-by-case basis”).
133. Stock, supra note 125, at 5.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 5 (“Practitioners report[ed] a variety of different approaches at different USCIS
offices.”).
136. 160 CONG. REC. H2328, H2329 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2014) (reproducing a July 2010 letter
from various members of the House of Representatives to Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano noting that DHS could join in motions to reopen, consider deferred action,
favorably exercise parole authority, forbear from initiating removal, or use other devices to
“ease the burden for soldiers suffering from immigration-related problems”).
137. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to The Honorable
Zoe Lofgren (Aug. 30, 2010), http://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/Napolitano-Letter-08.30.101.
pdf [http://perma.cc/K6CK-XPQJ]. Napolitano also noted ways that DHS, in conjunction with
the State Department, collaborated to expedite the adjudication of various waivers to the
reentry bar—discussed supra notes 111, 127 and accompanying text—or dependents who had
already departed the United States and were seeking an immigrant visa through consular
processing. Id.
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instructing field agents to make parole in place generally available for
the relatives of military members who were not inspected or paroled
138
upon entry.
One particularly noteworthy feature of this story involves
interagency communication, namely the Department of Defense’s
(DOD) especially active role in prevailing on DHS to take a more
consistent approach. DOD was concerned about morale problems
that service members, worried about the status of their family
139
members, would suffer in their ability to serve. DOD’s concerns
were not entirely out of sync with the interests of the immigration
agencies. Indeed, the BIA noted the same military-readiness issues
140
when it granted cancellation of removal to an undocumented spouse
and a four-year-old child of a U.S. service member deployed to a
141
combat zone in 2010. Members of Congress highlighted the
142
importance of the issue as well.
Even after DHS issued across-the-board guidance, DOD
continued to press for more and expansive use of parole in place—
this time for the family members of U.S. citizens seeking to enlist in

138. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., PM-602-0091, CHANGES TO B-2 STATUS
EXTENSIONS OF B-2 STATUS FOR COHABITATING PARTNERS AND OTHER
NONIMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS; REVISIONS TO ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL
(AFM) CHAPTERS 30.2 AND 30.3; AFM UPDATE AD11-27 (Nov. 15, 2013).
139. Id. (noting concern that military members would “face stress and anxiety because of the
immigration status of their family members in the United States”). A former commander of
ground forces in Iraq explained, “As a battlefield commander, the last thing I needed was a
soldier to be distracted by significant family issues back home. Resolving citizenship status for
family members while serving our country, especially during combat, must not be allowed to
continue detracting from the readiness of our forces.” 160 CONG. REC. H2328 (daily ed. Mar.
12, 2014) (quoting a letter from Retired Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez to the House
Committee on the Judiciary).
140. In the case of non-LPRs, cancellation of removal is limited to those who can establish,
inter alia, “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012). When a non-LPR is granted
cancellation of removal, he or she is granted lawful permanent residency. Id.
141. See Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation (HALT) Act: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 51 (2011) (statement of Prof. Margaret D. Stock).
An immigration judge denied the wife’s application for cancellation of removal, and the BIA
reversed. Id. The BIA recognized not only that the spouse’s removal from the country would
cause great emotional distress to the military member, but also that removal would diminish the
service member’s ability to fulfill his duties while deployed. See id.
142. See Hyde Letter, supra note 76, at 2 (“True hardship cases call for the exercise of such
discretion, and over the past year many Members of Congress have urged the INS to develop
guidelines for the use of its prosecutorial discretion.”).
AND
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the military. Again, based on DOD’s input, DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson “direct[ed] USCIS to work with the Department of Defense
to address the availability of parole in place and deferred action for
the spouse, parent, and child of a U.S citizen or lawful permanent
144
resident who seeks to enlist in the U.S. Armed Forces.” DOD’s
successful (and continued) effort in working with DHS demonstrates
how the overlapping interests of different agencies reinforced topdown, categorical enforcement policy. Thus, the military case study
adds to those vertical checks (via case-by-case exercises of discretion
on the ground) a horizontal layer (via interagency communication)
that bolsters across-the-board enforcement measures.
3. Gender-Based Asylum. The next case study concerns the
matter of asylum relief for victims of gender-motivated persecution.
This vital issue has involved numerous immigration agencies and
subagencies, at various rungs of the bureaucracy, in a conversation
about how to protect individuals who are at risk of facing rape,
domestic violence, or forced marriage upon return to their country of
145
origin. Although the evolution of this issue is extraordinarily
complex and difficult to trace, the absence of formal law on genderbased asylum has not prevented dramatic change, thanks largely to
146
work on the ground. Without any clear statutory protection or

143. As DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson noted in a November 2014 memorandum, DOD
requested that DHS “expand the scope of its parole-in-place memorandum of November 2013
to encompass family members of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who seek to enlist
in the U.S. armed forces.” Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Customs & Immigration Servs. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-materials/immigration/enforcementdetention-and-criminal-justice/government-documents/Parole%20for%20Families%20of%20
Military.pdf/at_download/file [http://perma.cc/RJ8M-QV9S].
144. Id.
145. The cognizability of asylum based on female genital mutilation is clearer. The BIA
issued a precedential decision on the subject of female genital mutilation in 1996. See In re
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996). Two years after Kasinga, the BIA denied
protection to a woman who had suffered past female genital cutting. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
296, 296 (B.I.A. 2007). This decision, which seemed to undermine Kasinga, was vacated by
Attorney General Mukasey in 2008 on the grounds that the BIA had erred in reasoning that
female genital mutilation cannot occur more than once. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617, 621
(A.G. 2008). Attorney General Mukasey outlined a framework for adjudicating asylum cases
based on past persecution, which the BIA adopted in a new 2009 ruling. In re A-T-, 25 I. & N.
Dec. 4, 9 (B.I.A. 2009).
146. The doctrinal question that remained (and to some degree remains) unanswered is
whether an individual fleeing persecution on account of gender satisfies the “particular social
group” requirement in the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2012).
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definitive BIA or federal court interpretation regarding gender-based
asylum protection, the law has developed piecemeal, often through
case-by-case adjudications in administrative and federal court.
Through decades of incremental development, lawyers on the
ground—both for immigrants and the government—“changed the
culture of the relevant immigration agencies [and] the perspective of
judges and other decisionmakers, in effect creating a body of
jurisprudence at the administrative level, which, despite its
147
nonprecedential nature, has had enormous impact.” Thus, “[g]ender
asylum in the United States . . . tells an unusual story of legal change
148
from the bottom up,” with lessons for interagency coordination,
adaptation, and learning.
Governmental efforts to protect victims of gender-based
persecution date back to 1995, when legacy INS—then a subagency of
DOJ—issued a guidance memorandum (the “Guidelines”) directed to
asylum officers that outlined the basis for favorable grants for
applicants who had experienced gender-based persecution—including
domestic violence, rape, female genital mutilation, and other forms of
149
violence.
The Guidelines were formed through collaboration
150
between advocates and government officials, attempting to bring
uniformity and consistency to adjudications by setting forth detailed
151
factors for asylum officers to consider. Because the Guidelines were
not mandatory, and were directed only to the complement of asylum
152
officers located within USCIS, they failed to produce any kind of
uniformity across all asylum adjudications within the immigration
courts or the federal court system. Thus, even as the Guidelines were
153
“highly normative and influential,” they were not binding on

147. See Anker, supra note 16, at 48.
148. Id. at 46.
149. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Immigration & Naturalization Servs. Office of Int’l
Affairs, to All INS Asylum Office 9–16 (May 26, 1995) [hereinafter INS Guidelines] (on file
with the Duke Law Journal). Canada’s 1993 Gender Guidelines served as a model for the 1995
U.S. guidelines. See Anker, supra note 16, at 54.
150. See Anker, supra note 16, at 55.
151. See INS Guidelines, supra note 149, at 9–16.
152. See Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance
and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29
REFUGEE SURV. Q. 2, 46, 52 (2010).
153. See Anker, supra note 16, at 55.
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154

immigration judges or the BIA and did not root out disparities in
155
adjudications of gender-based claims.
156
The BIA’s 1999 decision in Matter of R-A- reflected this lack of
clarity. In R-A-, the BIA denied asylum to Rody Alvarado, a
Guatemalan woman who had fled domestic abuse, including brutal
157
beatings and rape, calling into question whether persecution in the
form of domestic violence could provide the basis for a successful
158
asylum claim. Attorney General Janet Reno responded by vacating
R-A- and ordering the BIA to stay the decision in light of then159
pending DOJ regulations on the topic of gender-based asylum. The
proposed federal regulations, which reinforced that gender could
160
form the basis of a “particular social group” and provided guidance
161
162
for analyzing domestic-violence claims, were never finalized.

154. See Musalo, supra note 152, at 52–53.
155. Caroline J. O’Neill, Health Is a Human Right: Why the U.S. Immigration Law Response
to Gender-Based Asylum Claims Requires More Attention to International Human Rights
Norms, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 241, 242 (2000); see also Lisa C. Chan, Everything
in Moderation: Why Any Gender Nexus Under U.S. Asylum Law Must Be Strictly Limited in
Scope, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 169, 172 (2011) (arguing that the INS Guidelines have “failed to
achieve consistency among immigration officials over how to adjudicate . . . gender-based
claims”).
156. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated and remanded, 22 I. & N. Dec.
906 (A.G. 2001).
157. Id. at 908–09 (describing acts of abuse including the dislocating of the respondent’s
jawbone, repeated rapes, beatings to unconsciousness, and the throwing of a machete toward
the respondent’s body).
158. Id. As a result, advocates began relying on alternative legal theories, such as political
opinion or religion, to win asylum claims. Anker, supra note 16, at 56–57. This tactic proved
effective in In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (B.I.A. 2000), in which the BIA granted asylum on
account of religion to a Moroccan woman who had been physically abused by her father. Anker,
supra note 16, at 57.
159. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906 (A.G. 2001). These regulations were intended to
remove “certain barriers that the [In re R-A-] decision seem[ed] to pose.” Asylum and
Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (Dec. 7, 2000).
160. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (noting the requirement that an applicant for
asylum demonstrate persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion”).
161. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76588 (“This rule . . . restates that
gender can form the basis of a particular social group . . . [and] will aid in the assessment of
claims made by applicants who have suffered or fear domestic violence.”); see also Department
of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 5, In re R-A-, 22 I. &
N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A%20DHS%20brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/A94H-H84H] (“DHS expects that the final rule will
represent the conclusion that, under current law, it is possible for some limited number of
victims of domestic violence to establish that the harm they suffered or fear is on account of
membership in a particular social group . . . .”).

LANDAU IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1212

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2016 10:28 PM

[Vol. 65:1173

Instead, DOJ determined that a case-by-case approach “would be
163
better than a categorical rule.”
R-A- remained pending for almost a decade, and while the BIA
issued no decisions during that time regarding the cognizability of
164
gender- or domestic-violence-based asylum,
DHS changed its
position. Although it had appealed the initial grant of asylum to Rody
165
Alvarado, DHS submitted a brief to the BIA arguing that the Board
should grant asylum to “married women in Guatemala who are
166
unable to leave the relationship.” DHS argued that by not granting
asylum based on domestic violence, the BIA “would impede rational,
coherent development of particular social group law . . . [and] would
undermine clarity, consistency and fairness in the administration of
167
asylum law in general.”
While R-A- remained pending, the attorney general again
intervened. In 2005, John Ashcroft certified R-A- to himself (just as
Attorney General Reno had done) and ordered the BIA to
168
reconsider its decision following the publication of a proposed rule.
By 2008, these regulations had still not been finalized, so Attorney
General Michael Mukasey certified the case to himself, lifted the stay,
169
and remanded the case to the BIA for a decision. The BIA
remanded the case to the immigration judge, and in 2009 the
immigration judge granted Rody Alvarado asylum.
Although the decision was hailed as a victory, it applied only to
one individual, offering no precedent for the hundreds of other
170
pending cases. As a result, advocates turned to “nontraditional”

162. See Marsden, supra note 69, at 2529 (noting that the regulations were “abandoned after
George W. Bush took office in 2001”).
163. Id. at 2552.
164. See Anker, supra note 16, at 57.
165. See Musalo, supra note 152, at 58–59.
166. Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief,
supra note 161, at 19. DHS’s limited definition of the particular social group in this case
reflected a pattern among gender-based asylum applicants to define the group narrowly, given a
reluctance by courts to accept a definition of particular social group that is too large. See
Marsden, supra note 69, at 2527 (“Because courts have treated particular social groups that
hinge only on an applicant’s gender with skepticism, gender-based asylum claims often define
the particular social group more narrowly to make the group appear smaller.”).
167. Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondents Eligibility for Relief supra note
161, at 15–16.
168. In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005).
169. In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
170. Anker, supra note 16, at 57–58.
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sources of authority to make their arguments, including government
briefs (such as DHS’s brief in R-A-), INS and United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) gender guidelines, and more
172
recent guidance by USCIS for asylum officers. Attorneys drawing
on such “normative, but subregulatory sources” won cases, which in
173
turn “led to greater formalization of these sources.”
DHS’s recognition of domestic violence as a basis for asylum
174
increased with another domestic-violence case, Matter of L-R-.
Once again, as with R-A-, DHS submitted a brief recommending
175
asylum based on domestic violence. As a result, attorneys who had
relied on DHS’s brief in R-A- could also rely on its submission in L176
R- as a “de facto statement of agency policy.” Moreover, one year
after L-R- was decided, DHS issued written clarification
acknowledging that it considered domestic violence a valid basis for
177
asylum. Despite DHS’s position, the BIA remained silent on
whether gender could constitute a particular social group and whether
178
asylum claims could be based on domestic violence. However, in
2014, the BIA came closer to resolving these issues with its decision in
179
Matter of A-R-C-G-.
A-R-C-G- concerned a woman who fled Guatemala in 2005 to
180
escape the abuse she had suffered at the hands of her husband.
When she sought asylum, the immigration judge found that she was
not eligible because her husband’s acts of abuse, while arbitrary and

171. Id. at 58.
172. See id. at 58. The more recent USCIS guidance, like the INS Guidelines and UNHCR
guidelines, is neither binding on the agency nor enforceable in court. See ASYLUM DIV., U.S
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE: FEMALE
ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS 26 (2009), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson
%20Plans/Female-Asylum-Applicants-Gender-Related-Claims-31aug10.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
Z2R5-5UMD].
173. See Anker, supra note 16, at 53.
174. See Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief, In re L-R- (B.I.A. Apr.
13, 2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DSE3-9V3X].
175. Id. DHS noted that the “delay of over nine years in producing either regulations or an
authoritative administrative precedent” reflected the challenges presented by domestic-violence
asylum claims. Id. at 4.
176. Anker, supra note 16, at 58.
177. Id. at 59.
178. Id.
179. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
180. Id. at 389.
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“without reason,” did not constitute “persecution.” Noting that
“cases arising in the context of domestic violence generally involve
unique and discrete issues not present in other particular social group
182
determinations,” the BIA recognized, as a particular social group,
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
183
relationship.”
Although the BIA remanded the case to the
184
immigration judge, its ruling provided a useful roadmap for future
successful domestic-violence cases in immigration court.
There is still no binding rule on domestic violence as a basis for
asylum, but commentators see “reason . . . for some optimism”
through the various steps taken throughout varying levels of the
185
immigration agencies. Owing to the DHS briefs filed in R-A-, L-R-,
and A-R-C-G-, combined with decisions by individual immigration
judges and the BIA, litigants are increasingly able to bring successful
186
asylum claims on behalf of domestic-violence victims.
This
improved state of affairs has been credited to “a legal transformation
that occurred from the ground up” as well as “a long tradition of
adjudicators recognizing gender-based persecution and gender-based
187
asylum claims.” Owing to progress forged on the ground, “there is
now a ground-level jurisprudence that is having significant impact on
other aspects of refugee law and decisionmaking institutions including
188
at higher levels.”
4. Bureaucratic Resistance to Mandatory Detention. Bottom-up
agency influences are also evident in the occasional resistance by
immigration enforcement officers to experimental top-down policies
that placed unrealistic burdens on the immigration system and
undermined well-established agency practices. For example, in 2003,
the newly created DHS established pilot programs in three U.S. cities
requiring the automatic and immediate detention of all foreign
181. Id. at 390.
182. Id. at 394.
183. Id. at 390.
184. Id. at 396.
185. Anker, supra note 16, at 48.
186. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence As A Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case
Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 143 (2013)
(“In many cases, judges have accepted the DHS framework and recognized groups that include
some combination of the L-R- characteristics of gender, nationality, and status in the
relationship . . . .”).
187. Anker, supra note 16, at 67.
188. Id.
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nationals ordered removed by an immigration judge. Although
foreign nationals are ordinarily not detained upon being ordered
removed, the newly created Detention After Removal Hearing
(DARH) program, also known as “Operation Compliance,” required
automatic detention in all such cases. The policy was short-lived,
which practitioners attribute to the program’s unpopularity, not only
among foreign nationals and their attorneys, but also frontline
189
officers who enforce immigration law.
DHS created DARH in 2003 in an effort to address concerns
that too many nondetained foreign nationals ordered removed were
190
never actually deported. News reports consistently quoted an ICE
statistic that 85 percent of undocumented immigrants abscond; the
government estimated that there were about 400,000 foreign-national
191
fugitives within the United States. The DARH program, piloted in
192
Hartford and later rolled out in Atlanta and Denver, required that
an ICE detention officer take custody of each and every foreign
national ordered removed by an immigration judge—regardless of
193
whether that person appealed the order. DARH also required
189. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, Immigration Attorney in Private Practice
(Aug. 17, 2015) (notes on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that frontline prosecutors
disliked the program and sent their negative feedback up the chain of command); Telephone
Interview with Anthony Collins, Immigration Attorney in Private Practice (Oct. 7, 2015) (notes
on file with the Duke Law Journal) (remarking that DARH illustrates how immigration officers
resist top-down policies that lack buy-in).
190. For example, in one year, ICE removed 92 percent of detained foreign nationals but
had a much lower removal rate of 13 to 35 percent for those who were not detained.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DRO OPERATION ORDER 2-03
(HARTFORD PROJECT) 1 (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter HARTFORD PROJECT DRO OPERATION
ORDER] (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., DRO OPERATION ORDER 1-04 (ATLANTA PILOT) 1 (Apr. 2004)
[hereinafter ATLANTA PILOT DRO OPERATION ORDER] (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(citing an effective removal rate of 94 percent for detained foreign nationals but only 11 percent
for those who were not detained); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
REP. NO. I-2003-004, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S REMOVAL OF
ALIENS ISSUED FINAL ORDERS 11 (Feb. 2003), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/INS/e0304/
final.pdf [http://perma.cc/WC2R-KBEP] (citing an effective removal rate of 92 percent for
detained foreign nationals but only 13 percent for those who were not detained and noting this
low rate of removal existed despite corrective actions recommended years earlier).
191. See Bruce Finley, In New Push, Deportees Will be Jailed at Once, Efforts to Cut
Absconders Expands to Denver, DENVER POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at A1; Press Release, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, ICE Expands Pilot Project to Detain Deportable Aliens (Mar.
26, 2004).
192. The first program debuted in Hartford, Connecticut from August 12, 2003 through
October 12, 2003. See Hartford Pilot Project Briefing Paper (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(provided in response to FOIA request).
193. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, supra note 191.
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removal for foreign nationals who, while not ordered removed, were
194
granted voluntary departure with a condition of posting bond. Once
the judge issued a removal order or granted voluntary departure with
a condition of posting bond, the foreign national would be taken into
195
custody immediately.
The DARH program marked a dramatic shift from prior
enforcement policies in which ICE “refrained from making arrests at
immigration courts due to a lack of detention capacity and the
resistance of the private bar and advocates who maintain that regular
arrests at the courts will deter many aliens from showing up for
196
hearings.” Absent exceptional cases in which a foreign national was
a danger to the community or a flight risk, detention was generally
197
not imposed until all administrative appeals had been exhausted.
DARH changed the status quo by placing an Office of Detention and
198
Removal (DRO) officer in every courtroom; once in custody, ICE
revoked any previous bond. The foreign national could apply for
199
bond again, but bond amounts could soar higher than $200,000.
Unless released by DRO or the immigration judge, a foreign national
ordered removed was detained until the proceedings were
200
administratively final, or he or she was removed.
194. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: ICE’S
DETENTION AFTER REMOVAL HEARING (DARH) PROGRAM 1 (Apr. 9, 2004), http://american
immigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/lac_pa_041204.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8QQL-PNSM].
Voluntary departure is defined as “[t]he departure of an alien from the United States without an
order of removal. The departure may or may not have been preceded by a hearing before an
immigration judge. An alien allowed to voluntarily depart concedes removability but does not
have a bar to seeking admission at a port-of-entry at any time.” Voluntary Departure, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/voluntary-departure
[http://perma.cc/RWF4-NNMT].
195. See Memorandum from Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, EOIR, to Detention
and Removal Operations, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. app. At 1 (Mar. 26, 2004) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (provided in response to a FOIA request).
196. See ATLANTA PILOT DRO OPERATION ORDER, supra note 190, at 1.
197. See id. at 2 (noting that the target population for the program were those ordered
removed “on the non-detained docket” who lacked a criminal conviction or had been convicted
solely of a minor crime); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Foreigners Fighting Orders to Leave U.S.
May Face Jail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at A28; Matt Apuzzo, Illegal Immigrants in
Connecticut Arrested Before Appeals as Part of Homeland Security Pilot Program, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Sept. 16, 2003.
198. See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 197, at A28; Memorandum from Dir., Office of Det.
and Removal, to Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 27, 2003) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
199. See Hartford Pilot Project Briefing Paper, supra note 192, at 1 (noting that bonds
ranged “from $5,000 to more than $200,000”).
200. Id.

LANDAU IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

2/21/2016 10:28 PM

1217
201

DARH was part of a larger effort by DHS called “Endgame,” a
ten-year strategic plan created by DRO to try and reduce the number
of fugitive foreign nationals. It was composed of the DARH program,
the electronic-monitoring-device program (which placed an electronic
monitoring device on nondetained foreign nationals to track them
202
while awaiting removal), and a telephone-reporting program.
The Hartford pilot program was short-lived, and there is very
203
little reporting about the policy or its demise.
However,
immigration attorneys have attributed its fall to resistance from both
204
the private bar as well as from some within DHS. According to
Michael Boyle, an attorney in North Haven, Connecticut, DHS trial
attorneys abhorred the program and wanted it to end. Boyle also
observed that government prosecutors preferred to spend time on
heavy-duty enforcement efforts, defying DARH in more run-of-the205
mill cases. Anthony Collins, another local attorney practicing during
the time of DARH, noted that the policy was especially punitive in
cases in which immigrants ordered removed had viable grounds for an
appeal and faced detention and separation from their families before
206
their appeal could be heard. Practicing attorneys also remarked that
the potential consequence of prolonged detention chilled some
foreign nationals from seeking various benefits or other forms of
207
immigration relief in the first place.
Immigration judges would respond to DARH by holding bond
hearings immediately at the conclusion of a merits hearing so that a
foreign national ordered detained would not necessarily be placed in
208
custody during the interim between the merits and bond hearings.
On occasion, DHS attorneys appeared willing to use what little

201. Teresa Borden, Q&A/John Mata, U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs: ‘80,000
Criminal Aliens Are Roaming Our Streets’, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 1, 2004, at F3.
202. Id.
203. See ATLANTA PILOT DRO OPERATION ORDER, supra note 190, at 1 (noting that “[t]he
Hartford Project took place over a period of sixty days”). Following the conclusion of the
Hartford pilot program, DHS piloted DARH in Denver, Colorado, and Atlanta, Georgia, from
April 2004 to August 31, 2004. See id. at 3; Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
supra note 191. As in the case of Hartford, the government never made these programs
permanent.
204. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, supra note 189.
205. Id.
206. Telephone Interview with Anthony Collins, supra note 189.
207. Id.; Telephone Interview with Joseph Tapper, Immigration Attorney in Private Practice
(Oct. 9, 2015) (notes on file with the Duke Law Journal).
208. Telephone Interview with Anthony Collins, supra note 189.
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discretion they had to spare foreign nationals the program’s harsh
consequence. Collins recalls one particularly sympathetic case
involving a Polish immigrant who faced technical hurdles to getting
relief. In that case, the DHS trial attorney took the unusual step of
consenting to a continuance so that the foreign national would not be
209
subject to mandatory detention. Continuances in that court were
exceedingly rare during this time, but the trial attorney’s consent
210
provided a reprieve long enough to outlast the DARH program.
DARH faced additional, practical hurdles as well. ICE had
211
limited bed space and would prioritize those with criminal records;
requiring automatic detention of noncriminal cases threatened to
212
overwhelm immigration-detention facilities. Moreover, in Hartford,
the nearest detention centers were fairly far away from the
213
immigration court, creating additional work for deportation officers
and making it hard for ICE officers to comply. The program also
raised concerns for the effects it would have on more vulnerable
214
asylum-seekers.
Given how little information exists on the DARH program, one
can only speculate why it never matured into the program some
within the Bush administration imagined it would become. But
members of the immigration bar believe that feedback being sent up
the chain was negative and that the program failed because it lacked
215
buy-in from the agency’s own long-term experts. Thus, to the extent
there were concerns that DARH would become national policy,
practitioners took some solace “when prosecutors were telling us
216
[that DARH] was a nightmare for them and for the judges too.”
C. Executive Deferred Action and Bottom-Up Innovation
The correlations between frontline exercises of case-by-case
discretion and certain across-the-board policies raise the question
whether the more recent executive branch programs, DACA and
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 197, at A28.
212. Id.
213. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, supra note 189 (noting that the two closest
facilities were in Greenfield, Massachusetts, and Wyatt, Rhode Island).
214. Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 197.
215. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, supra note 189; Telephone Interview with
Anthony Collins, supra note 189.
216. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, supra note 189.
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DAPA, have similar relationships with individual decisions on the
ground. Interestingly, a number of recent empirical studies suggest
217
that such correlations may exist. Shoba Wadhia’s analysis of
deferred action cases processed by ICE field offices from October
2011 through June 2012 demonstrates that two of the three most
common factors for a favorable grant—“having a [U.S-citizen]
dependent [] or being an individual in the United States since
218
childhood” —are the same criteria for DACA and DAPA, which
prevent family separation through the deportation of foreign
nationals who arrived as children and the undocumented parents of
219
U.S.-citizen and LPR children. A study by Leon Wildes of deferred
action statistics from USCIS reveals similar results. Although the
Wildes study is much older, it notes that two of the three most
common factors for granting deferred action were to protect foreign220
national youths and to prevent the separation of families.
To be sure, DACA and DAPA are clearly a result of
decisionmaking by high-level officials, responding in part to other
high-level influences and pressures to find ways to avoid deporting
DREAMers and other foreign nationals who have long resided in the
United States and to focus resources on criminal offenders instead.
Indeed, one could argue that DACA and DAPA would have been
adopted regardless of how frontline agents, acting on their own, had
chosen to exercise discretion in individual cases. Yet these empirical
studies reinforce the idea that ground-level decisions could bear on
across-the-board deferred action programs; more positively,
categorical executive policy could even be rooted in case-by-case
discretionary exercises by longtime agency experts who enforce the
221
law on a daily basis.
The inquiry into correlations between case-by-case exercises and
categorical policy also helps shore up a vague dividing line between
supposedly legitimate and illegitimate uses of deferred action. For
example, a November 2014 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
memorandum that provides reinforcement for two of three proposed
DHS policies adamantly rejects expanding categorical deferred action

217. See, e.g., Wadhia, Great FOIA Adventure, supra note 32, at 369; Wadhia, Sharing
Secrets, supra note 55, at 6; Wildes, supra note 32, at 830.
218. Wadhia, Great FOIA Adventure, supra note 32, at 369.
219. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
220. Wildes, supra note 32, at 830.
221. See infra Part IV.A.
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222

to the parents of DACA recipients. In its support of DAPA, the
OLC opinion makes traditional separation-of-powers arguments
223
couched in congressional acquiescence to administration policy. For
example, it highlights, as a basis for vindicating DAPA, a
longstanding agency policy of prioritizing removal of particular
categories of foreign nationals without any apparent objection from
224
Yet, where the parents of DACA recipients are
Congress.
concerned, OLC was “aware of no precedent for using deferred
225
action in this way,” concluding that this category of individuals
would be “unlike prior deferred action programs in which Congress
226
has acquiesced.”
Nevertheless, the memorandum offered the suggestion that its
conclusion regarding categorical determinations for the parents of
DACA recipients might shift if case-by-case discretionary decisions
pointed to an established practice of protecting such individuals:
DHS, of course, remains free to consider whether to grant deferred
action to individual parents of DACA recipients on an ad hoc basis.
But in the absence of clearer indications that the proposed classbased deferred action program for DACA parents would be
consistent with the congressional policies and priorities embodied in
the immigration laws, we conclude that it would not be
227
permissible.

This statement, however enigmatic, could provide support for the
idea that future executive deferred action programs might be
legitimated by a groundswell of similar case-by-case determinations
on the ground. Although there is little empirical evidence at this time
that favorable exercises of discretion have been routinely granted to
individuals with non-U.S.-citizen or non-LPR dependents, such a

222. See OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at 31–33.
223. See id. at 23 (“[P]erhaps the clearest indication that these features of deferred action
programs are not per se impermissible is the fact that Congress, aware of these features, has
repeatedly enacted legislation appearing to endorse such programs.”).
224. Id. at 7–8 (“In their exercise of enforcement discretion, DHS and its predecessor, INS,
have long employed guidance instructing immigration officers to prioritize the enforcement of
the immigration laws against certain categories of aliens and to deprioritize their enforcement
against others.”).
225. Id. at 33.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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228

practice could emerge. Ground-level “deferred action decisions are
not limited to the presence or absence of a dependent with lawful
229
status,” and the development of case-by-case agency precedent for
the parents of DACA recipients could lay a foundation for similar
categorical action in the future.
IV. DISCRETION AND AGENCY “COMMON LAW”
Although the Obama administration’s use of categorical
enforcement discretion has brought renewed attention to
230
the availability of immigration
prosecutorial discretion,
enforcement discretion is well established in decades of memoranda
231
issued to the field. Though these memoranda lack the procedures
associated with notice-and-comment rulemaking, they do not entirely
lack the features of agency “precedent.” Frontline discretion has a
long pedigree within the immigration agencies, with increasingly
232
open-ended criteria underlying favorable exercises of discretion. To
the extent that case-by-case exercises of discretion crowd around
certain common themes, those exercises of discretion can contribute
to the development of agency understandings, or best practices, which
in turn guide future enforcement decisions. Moreover, the
congruence between lower-level exercises of discretion and acrossthe-board agency policy could be a basis for vindicating categorical
executive action. Thus, rather than uphold (or invalidate) executive
deferred action programs exclusively through a formalistic reading of
233
Chevron, or seek to exempt enforcement policies from judicial

228. As Shoba Wadhia has noted, grants of deferred action to individuals without a U.S.citizen dependent have thus far focused primarily on those individuals who serve as primary
caregivers to individuals with a serious physical or mental illness. See Wadhia, Great FOIA
Adventure, supra note 32, at 369.
229. Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar & Clinical
Professor of Law, Pa. State Dickinson Sch. of Law et al. to President Barack Obama 2 (Nov. 3,
2014), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/WHLetterFinalNovember20142.
pdf [http://perma.cc/UCX5-HBM9].
230. See supra notes 1–3, 7–8 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra Part II.B.
233. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(requiring deference to reasonable agency interpretations of vague statutory language);
Compare Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178–86 (5th Cir. 2015) (using the Chevron
framework to enjoin the 2014 deferred action initiatives as “manifestly contrary” to, and an
unreasonable interpretation of, the INA), cert. granted, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257 (U.S. Jan.
19, 2016), with id. at 215–18 (King, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s decision to
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review altogether, courts might analyze executive branch policy
through the alternative source of frontline enforcement. Such an
analysis, grounded in expertise rather than political accountability, is
a bedrock justification for the administrative process and a well235
established, if undervalued, doctrinal basis for judicial deference.
On this account, the reviewing court would consider, among other
things, whether a particular executive policy being challenged was
supported by frontline enforcement decisions on the ground. Indeed,
there already is some evidence that the Supreme Court applies these
more functionalist frameworks to review the legitimacy of
236
administrative action. In short, the relationship between top-down
decisions and more ordinary manifestations in the field could be a
basis for thinking about the legitimacy of across-the-board
237
enforcement policies.
A. Enforcement, Longstanding Practice, and Deference
The broad range of considerations spelled out in agency field
memoranda have not prevented frontline enforcement decisions from
crowding around certain specific factors—in particular, hardship
238
caused by separating families and removing foreign-national youths.
Not only have frontline officers taken a lead role in deciding which
kinds of cases can be most worthy of prosecutorial discretion, but
exercises of discretion have helped create new forms of deportation
relief. Indeed, deferred action itself emerged from local practice—not
statutory authorization—something OLC noted in its opinion lending

address the substantive APA issue but finding, in any event, that the programs would not
violate Chevron).
234. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding “that an agency’s decision not
to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally
committed to an agency’s absolute discretion”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, 20–21,
United States v. Texas, 2015 WL 7308179 (Nov. 20, 2015) (No. 15-674) (invoking Heckler as a
basis to legitimate the 2014 reforms).
235. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990) (noting that
“practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference”);
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (noting that “administrative judgments are
entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts” when they are “the product of
administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the
statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts”).
236. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part III.C.
238. See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text.
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support for DAPA. Thus, there are good reasons to look to
frontline enforcement as a basis for bottom-up innovation. Case-bycase decisions could be harnessed to identify certain new and
previously overlooked categories of immigrants deserving relief—not
to mention novel ways of protecting them. Once these lower-level
experiments reach a saturation point, they may provide justificatory
support for higher-level, across-the-board agency action.
The wide availability of ground-level discretion, combined with
added possibilities for vibrant exchange between those at the highest
and lowest echelons of the agency, could imbue top-down decisions
with a stronger basis in agency expertise, which in turn enhances the
durability of across-the-board executive programs. Because the
“bureaucracy creates a civil service not beholden to any particular
administration and a cadre of experts with a long-term institutional
240
worldview,” increased coordination between higher-level officials
and lower-level officers could supply executive enforcement policies
with greater doctrinal and normative backing. Although the technical
expertise of long time agency bureaucrats has hardly figured into the
legal and scholarly debates regarding across-the-board enforcement
policies such as DACA and DAPA, it seems only reasonable to look
to ground-level enforcement for insights into whether the Obama
administration’s policies are supported by the kind of technical
specialization and expertise that are a bedrock of ordinary deference
241
doctrines.
The OLC opinion discussed in Part III endorses this expertise242
based rationale. The opinion makes clear that “any expansion of
deferred action to new classes of aliens must be carefully scrutinized
to ensure that it reflects considerations within the agency’s
243
expertise.” Moreover, as previously mentioned, the opinion, in its
brief section finding unacceptable a policy protecting the parents of
DACA recipients, appears to draw connections between favorable
239. As OLC noted, “[a]lthough the practice of granting deferred action ‘developed without
express statutory authorization,’ it has become a regular feature of the immigration removal
system that has been acknowledged by both Congress and the Supreme Court.” OLC Opinion,
supra note 55, at 13 (citation omitted).
240. Katyal, supra note 6, at 2317.
241. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 106 (2006) (“Historically, when courts decide whether to award
deference to an executive interpretation, they have considered three factors: expertise, whether
there has been a delegation from Congress, and political accountability.”).
242. See supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.
243. OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at 24.
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exercises of discretion in discrete cases and categorical executive
244
policies. The opinion also makes repeated references to the
importance of preserving “case-by-case determinations about
whether an individual alien’s circumstances warrant the expenditure
245
of removal resources.”
A more full-throated argument linking bureaucratic expertise
with individual enforcement decisions can be found within Arizona v.
246
United States,
which highlights the critical role of individual
enforcement decisions as a basis for deference. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion provides a subtle portrayal of the bureaucrat-asexpert, explicitly recognizing the significance of discretion in discrete
cases:
A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion
exercised by immigration officials. Federal officials, as an initial
matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at
all. . . . ICE officers are responsible “for the identification,
247
apprehension, and removal of illegal aliens in the United States.”

The Court’s recent treatment of immigration enforcement discretion
thus supports incorporating lower-level influences in considerations
248
of agency expertise.
Although Arizona’s discussion of executive discretion emerges in
the federalism context, its functionalist, expertise-based account of
deference converges with other, similar administrative-law decisions
of late that deviate from a formal, accountability-based theory of
249
deference to agency determinations. It is beyond the scope of this

244. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at 11.
246. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). Arizona held that three provisions of
an Arizona law tying criminal penalties to federal immigration policies were preempted by
federal law because of Congress’s occupation of the field. See id. at 2501–07. The Court upheld
one portion of the law requiring state officers to make a reasonable effort to determine the
immigration status of a detainee when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the
person is unlawfully present in the United States. See id. at 2507–10.
247. Id. at 2499–500 (citations omitted) (quoting OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 2 (2011)).
248. Cf. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 132 (pointing out that recent changes in
immigration law “have simply moved the power to provide relief to the arrest and charging
phase, shifting the judgment from immigration judges to prosecutors and immigration police”).
249. See generally Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917 (2012)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s preference for Justice Jackson’s functionalist Youngstown
framework over bright-line invocations of Chevron in a range of administrative-law contexts,
with a focus on national-security cases); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
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Article to engage in a full analysis of the interplay between these
recent doctrinal developments and an expertise-based model of
agency policy grounded in routine administrative practices—a topic
for future scholarship. But the idea of analyzing the connections
between across-the-board agency policy and frontline exercises of
discretion in discrete cases could be important to preserving the
vitality of executive deferred action policies—an important matter
given the Supreme Court’s decision to review the 2014 reforms
250
around DAPA and expanded DACA. In a doctrinal field saturated
with puzzling deference doctrines, a theory of agency buy-in could be
vital to the preservation of administrative policies.
In short, bureaucratic buy-in could supply DACA and DAPA
with an added—and needed—measure of legitimacy. Indeed,
presidential administrations should not refrain from touting the
extent to which across-the-board enforcement policies are consistent
not only with decades of agency guidelines, but also enforcement
decisions rendered on the ground. In noting the way that frontline
exercises of discretion coalesce around certain specific factors,
presidential administrations can maintain that categorical
policymaking provides a curative to inequities on the ground—
bringing all frontline enforcement into alignment with emerging best
practices. In the same way that congressional findings and legislative
history might help shore up vague statutory text, ground-level agency
decisions that accumulate over time could provide support for
executive branch policies that protect entire categories of individuals.
B. Agency Experimentation and “Common Law”
Administrative-law theorists have observed that “creativity is
251
impossible without discretion.” Legislatures identify problems, but
administrative agents do the hard work of deriving solutions. In a
seminal volume on administrative law and justice, Kenneth Culp
Davis provided the following description of the role of the
bureaucratic agent:

Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1179 (2008) (“[S]tatutory subject matter and
institutional context appear to be more important in the Justices’ own evaluation of agency
inputs than the rhetorical ‘deference’ regime the Justices attach to the case.”).
250. United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016).
251. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 20
(1969).
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[T]he delegate, through case-to-case consideration, where the
human mind is often at its best, nibbles at the problem and finds
little solutions for each little bite of the big problem. Creativeness in
the nibbling sometimes opens the way for perspective thinking
about the whole big problem, and large solutions sometimes
252
emerge.

As frontline immigration officers begin to converge on shared
discretionary decisions—whether for the partners and spouses of gay
253
and lesbian U.S. citizens and LPRs or the family members of U.S.254
citizen military personnel —those decisions, over time, contribute to
a process of legal development that can be analogized to “the creation
255
of [agency] common law.” And as much as the analogy to a
common-law or quasi-common-law process could help to provide a
doctrinal foundation for top-down executive action, it also serves as a
practical basis for novel instances of categorical executive policy.
The phrase “administrative common law” generally refers to
judicially created doctrines of administrative law and procedural
256
257
review, but it relates to internal agency practices as well. Under
258
the conventional literature, the “common law” aspects of judicial
review of administrative law include a judge-centric adjudicative
process that develops the doctrinal framework incrementally with a
noted reliance on precedent—a kind of stare decisis for
259
administrative-law adjudications.
But the term “administrative
common law” also can be said to refer to the incremental
development of law and policy within the executive branch, by
252. Id.
253. See supra Part III.B.1.
254. See supra Part III.B.2.
255. DAVIS, supra note 251, at 21.
256. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2012).
257. See Davidson & Leib, supra note 44, at 262 (discussing the idea of administrative
common law in the context of OIRA’s lawmaking functions).
258. Commentators traditionally conceive of administrative common law as a byproduct of
federal appellate review of administrative-law adjudications. As Gillian Metzger notes, many
administrative-law doctrines are “judicially created at their core,” with the development of
Chevron deference for reviewing agency statutory interpretations a “central example.” See
Metzger, supra note 256, at 1299; see also Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in
Administrative Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 21 (2011) (“[The Chevron] doctrine is the
quintessential common law creation.”); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189 (1998) (referring to Chevron as “[t]he most important opinion
in administrative common law”).
259. Metzger, supra note 256, at 1313.
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administrative agencies themselves. This idea of administrative
common law usually concerns the development of agency action—
mainly through agency adjudication—that produces a law common to
261
the agency.
If, as Cass Sunstein has declared, “agencies have become modern
262
America’s common law courts,” the conception of administrative
common law might also describe the incremental development of
agency decisionmaking, whether through adjudication or enforcement
practices. Importing the concepts of administrative common law from
the judicial review context to internal agency practices can provide
the latter with a more “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles [that] contributes to the actual and
263
perceived integrity of the [administrative] process.”
If
“administrative agencies [have] displace[d] the previously central role
264
of federal courts in the making of federal common law,” the
iterative process of agency decisionmaking, including enforcement
decisions, merits attention—especially given the nonreviewability of
265
frontline enforcement decisions. These enforcement determinations

260. See id. at 1295 n.1 (“The term ‘administrative common law’ is also sometimes used to
refer to common law created by agencies, for example through adjudication . . . .”); see also
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 693
(2005) (“To some extent, administrative policymaking is similar to judicial lawmaking in the
general common-law system.”).
261. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts,
47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998) (“Operating as common law courts, agencies have, as they
should, considerable power to adapt statutory language to changing understandings and
circumstances.”).
262. Id.
263. Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
917, 927 (2006) (citations omitted). As Murphy has argued, “[t]he persistence of this theme in
administrative law is not surprising. The idea that past practices constrain the present—both to
limit the scope of arbitrary official discretion and to ensure equal treatment of persons over
time—is old and powerful.” Id. at 932. Given that “the vast bulk of agency interpretations are
issued through myriad non-legislative means such as formal adjudications, opinion letters, and
manuals,” id. at 933, presidential measures on the scale of DACA and DAPA may be as much
about bringing procedural consistency to long time agency practices as striking out new
legislative ground.
264. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement
of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1719 (2001).
265. Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 286–92 (noting the “Supreme
Court’s reluctance to permit judicial review over prosecutorial discretion”); see also Reno v.
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999) (citing Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985)) (upholding broad executive branch enforcement discretion
despite claims that prosecutorial discretion was used in a discriminatory manner).
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can reveal insights into an internal body of common customs or
266
conventions reflecting longtime agency practices.
Under this theory of administrative common law, decisions by
frontline officers and agency staff, and the broader policies
267
incorporated in agency memoranda, incrementally help to develop a
culture, and—eventually—a body of precedent that is persuasive,
though not binding, on the higher ranks. Such lower-level exercises
provide information regarding uses of discretion that contribute
incrementally to the development of longstanding agency policy, a
268
bedrock of the common-law tradition.
This process is most
pronounced in agency settings characterized by widely delegated
prosecutorial discretion—a hallmark of federal immigration
269
enforcement. Rather than mechanistically applying codified criteria,
the presence of a more open-ended enforcement standard
memorialized in longstanding agency practices allows immigration
officers to find in the existing guidelines ways of interpreting the
individual facts of a given case to novel ends. The enforcement
decisions that spring from these exercises of discretion are generally
grounded in a routine (and often long-term) exposure to immigration270
law issues, an expertise formed through repeated exposure to

266. See Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 32, 60–61 (D.D.C. 1998) (referring
to “rules implicit in an agency’s course of conduct where that conduct gives rise to a ‘common
law’ administrative rule”); see also Davidson & Leib, supra note 44, at 274 (noting that
traditional “modes of stare decisis do not exhaust the possibilities for thinking about how to
reason from precedent” and “that stare decisis can carry several meanings within the Executive
Branch . . . . Calibrating the right mix of precedent, reason-giving, and transparency is all on the
agenda for regleprudence”).
267. See supra Part II.B.
268. Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have identified this administrative common-law
process at work in the development of federal privacy law at the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 619–27 (2014). In enforcement actions at the FTC, agency
actors employ settlement agreements and consent decrees, nonadjudicative resolutions, as a
body of precedent that functions much like a body of common-law precedent. See id. The
highest level of decision makers at the FTC, the commissioners themselves, control this
formulation of administrative common law by formulating and voting on these settlements and
consent orders. Id. In this way, an administrative common law of privacy is incrementally
developed in a nonadjudicative setting from the top-down.
269. Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 246–65 (describing the history of
prosecutorial discretion in frontline immigration enforcement).
270. Cf. James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 376 (1976) (“The continuing expertness of an administrative agency as to matters of
technical substance can be more properly understood as deriving primarily from its staff.”).
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“similar matters over and over again.” Over time, as favorable
exercises of case-by-case discretion gravitate toward the periphery of
pre-established criteria, these seemingly boundary-line cases, upon
272
reaching saturation, become a new body of agency precedent. As
lower-level officers slowly create a body of law common to the
agency, their work provides not only doctrinal support for executive
action, but a broader form of legitimacy rooted in the expertise of
lower-level day-to-day enforcement.
Current immigration structures lack any formal mechanisms that
allow frontline experiments to filter up to the highest levels of the
executive and inform policy on a national scale; put another way,
immigration agencies lack the kind of constant interplay between
lower-level laboratories and higher-level adaptation associated with
273
“experimentalist” regimes. Nevertheless, the agency could adopt
practices that would greatly improve the possibilities for higher-level
officials to seek input from frontline officers. This Article’s conclusion
suggests reforms that would enhance opportunities for dialogue
between higher-level officials and lower-level officers based on the
latter’s use of discretion in their daily enforcement of immigration
law.
V. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF BOTTOM-UP INNOVATION
Lower-level exercises of discretion, and the variances to which
they give rise, raise a number of normative concerns about procedural
regularity. After all, novel exercises of lower-level bureaucratic
discretion, notwithstanding their potential benefits, will almost
certainly produce large discrepancies in frontline implementation—
with wild inconsistencies, a lack of transparency, and other inequities
that undermine important procedural values such as evenhandedness,
274
Moreover, because
interpretive consistency, and transparency.

271. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1484–85 (2009).
272. To borrow from a different constitutional context, agency practices could be vindicated
by their rootedness in “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
273. See supra notes 18, 45–46 and accompanying text.
274. The gender-based asylum case study, see supra Part III.B.3, highlights these sorts of
difficulties. For years, gender-based asylum cases languished in a sea of inconsistent rules,
opinions, and guidance documents. The 1995 Guidelines had no binding effect on any of the
adjudicatory bodies handling gender-based claims—producing wildly different outcomes. And
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frontline discretion is not subject to judicial review, only top-down
and across-the-board interventions ensure equity in law
administration and application. Indeed, even a common practice that
generally enjoys a longstanding history will, without categorical
implementation, be applied unevenly on the ground. This problem—
one that scholars have appropriately sought to remedy—has
produced calls for various kinds of administrative-law solutions. But,
while top-down decisionmaking remains critical—both to bring equity
to lower-level enforcement decisions and to supervise officers who do
not make proper use of enforcement discretion—the mechanisms
some have proposed could stifle the immediate and long-term
benefits that lower-level experimentation and bottom-up innovation
could have for the agency as a whole.
A. The Benefits of Top-Down Solutions—and Their Limits
Empirical research has documented the variances of lower-level
discretion—including problems in which “seemingly eligible
applicants are denied and less worthy cases are granted deferred
276
action status.” Wadhia’s 2013 analysis of ICE’s deferred action
enforcement discretion demonstrated significant disparities in the
outcome of deferred action decisions across ICE’s twenty-four
277
Enforcement and Removal Operations field offices.
These
discrepancies have prompted scholars to advocate top-down solutions
as a mechanism for controlling inconsistencies and other rule-of-law
problems that are inherent to decentralized enforcement regimes.
Wadhia has argued that deferred action policy should be embodied
within agency regulations promulgated under notice-and-comment
rulemaking, promoting values such as “transparency, consistency,
278
acceptability, and accountability.” Wildes has made a similar

DHS’s litigation position in the R-A- and L-R- briefs were hardly binding within the rest of
DHS, leaving gender-based asylum on unsteady legal footing. Although A-R-C-G- has been
hailed as a victory, the lack of consistent, top-down guidance for gender-based asylum plagued
that issue, creating a “vacuum in the formal law as it related to domestic violence claims.”
Anker, supra note 16, at 58.
275. See supra note 265.
276. Wildes, supra note 32, at 837–38. For a discussion of the distressing variances in asylum
adjudications, see generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag,
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007).
277. Wadhia, Great FOIA Adventure, supra note 32, at 370–73.
278. Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 55, at 60–61.
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Instituting agency regulations for the exercises of
argument.
deferred action would indeed serve the goal of reducing these
disparities and treating like cases alike.
These calls for regulatory action echo prior ones, including Colin
Diver’s early criticism of legacy INS’s refusal to codify existing
standards for exercising discretion in the related arena of adjustment
280
of status applications. Indeed, legacy INS had proposed regulations
281
to govern the wide discretion in that analogous context, but the
process was rescinded in 1981 during the changeover to the Reagan
282
administration. The agency explained that it was withdrawing the
proposed rule because it could not “foresee and enumerate all the
favorable or adverse factors which may be relevant and should be
283
considered in the exercise of administrative discretion.”
The
concern was that codification might preclude the use of discretion in
new and previously unanticipated situations: “Listing some factors,
even with the caveat that such list is not all inclusive, poses a danger
that use of guidelines may become so rigid as to amount to an abuse
284
of discretion.”
From this perspective, the Obama administration’s deferred
action programs, although not a product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, are still a vast improvement in the way they bring
uniformity and consistency to certain enforcement decisions. Indeed,
scholars have hailed the Obama administration for bringing greater
transparency and predictability to its enforcement policies. Cox and
Rodríguez praise programs such as DACA and DAPA for making
“the exercise of discretion more rule-like, centralized, and
285
transparent.” And they commend the “substitution of delegated and

279. Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: Internal Guides
or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 106 (1980) (arguing that the prosecutorialdiscretion guidelines “should probably be subject to the notice and publication requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act”).
280. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 92–97
(1983).
281. Id. at 93.
282. Id. at 94.
283. Id.
284. Id. Diver argued that the agency’s stated rationale was a smokescreen for fears of
increased litigation that would arise in the wake of substantive regulations. Id. (“At least the
Service is consistent: its explanations are no more transparent than its rules. In order to fathom
the rejection of the proposed rule, we must look behind the official explanation. Several INS
district officials feared increased litigation.”).
285. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 111.

LANDAU IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1232

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2016 10:28 PM

[Vol. 65:1173
286

visible authority for discretionary and opaque authority.” In the
case of DACA, Andrias argues that the Obama administration’s
disclosure of its legal rationale promoted transparency and
287
accountability through public monitoring.
Yet the same argument for transparency that supposedly affirms
the Obama administration’s policies could sink them as well. First,
scholars of administrative law have raised concerns about the
replacement of notice-and-comment rulemaking with subregulatory
288
or nonlegislative rules, and a federal district court has halted the
2014 programs nationwide, based on the legal conclusion that the
Obama administration failed to subject them to notice-and-comment
289
rulemaking. Thus, transparency alone may not be sufficient to
infuse programs like DACA and DAPA with rule-of-law content.
Moreover, transparency is not a one-way ratchet, and a presidential
administration could, in the name of “transparency” or “consistency,”
produce a set of very different, immigrant-unfriendly directives as
opposed to the current, more immigrant-affirming ones.
Scholars also have cited Arizona v. United States as vindication
290
for top-down executive deferred action initiatives. Yet Arizona is
not singularly focused on categorical executive policy. Rather, its
portrayal of prosecutorial discretion is remarkably nuanced, focusing
largely on immigration enforcement through the lens of discrete cases
and decisions by immigration officials rather than categorical
291
policies.
This discussion raises the broader question whether solutions
grounded entirely within the upper echelons of the executive always
provide the best mechanism for innovating administrative policy. The
president can use his appointment-and-removal powers to politicize

286. Id. at 118; see also id. at 135–36 (“The Administration’s enforcement policy as a whole
has become increasingly directed at regularizing and making more consistent . . . a system
executive leadership came to see as too random and overly subject to the views of low-level
bureaucrats and state and local officials.”).
287. See Andrias, supra note 2, at 1089–90, 1118.
288. For a discussion of the concerns attending alternatives to substantive rulemaking
procedures, see, for example, Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of
Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 579–85 (2012) (recounting the debate over
nonlegislative rules).
289. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
290. Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 64 (2015) (statement of Prof. Stephen H. Legomsky);
Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 133–34, 145 n.119, 205.
291. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
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the bureaucracy, exercise control through Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) via budgetary decisions, and influence agency
292
rulemaking through OIRA review. But these are blunt tools that
are rife with structural obstacles, principal-agent problems, and
293
pragmatic hurdles to effective governance. Appointments require
the selection of candidates who will remain loyal to the president’s
policy preferences and are subject to “countervailing legislative
294
pressures” derived from the Senate’s advice-and-consent powers.
Budgetary control and OIRA review can push the bureaucracy
toward certain policy goals, but both may be too blunt to adequately
institute policy change, especially where the president seeks to
influence how lower-level officers exercise their enforcement
295
discretion. At base, each of these mechanisms of top-down control
requires that the president choose between anticipating (and
avoiding) policy problems before they arise or fixing them after they
occur. Both tools may be too imprecise to accomplish such goals.
Although top-down control is a useful mechanism for bringing
uniformity to enforcement discrepancies on the ground, there is a
question whether it sufficiently responds to the unique kinds of policy
problems that arise in immigration—especially nascent or rapidly
changing ones. The limitation of top-down approaches may thus
invite new inquiries into lower-level influences and the ways that
ground-level officers provide input into emerging categories of
individuals who deserve protection.
B. Executive Branch Initiatives and Bureaucratic Buy-In
Allowing lower-level agency officers to experiment with novel
solutions on the ground helps to sidestep some of the limitations
scholars have attributed to insufficiently anticipatory or responsive
top-down controls. Decisions on the ground can suggest small
adjustments in how and when discretion is exercised, bringing both

292. Nou, supra note 3, at 1765, 1766–69.
293. See id.; Stephenson, supra note 3.
294. Nou, supra note 3, at 1765.
295. Id. at 1766 n.1; Andrias, supra note 2, at 1083–84, 1104 (arguing for the creation of a
new office in OMB “dedicated to problems of regulatory compliance . . . [to] further the
efficiency and accountability goals of administration,” but noting that “a reactive system
mirroring that of OIRA, whereby all significant individual enforcement actions require White
House clearance, would undermine efficiency goals . . . [especially] when lower-level or local
officials might have better information”).
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greater precision and innovation. Perhaps most significant is that
frontline officers can report the effectiveness of their experimentation
up the chain of command and better enable policymakers to make
positive choices regarding ex ante and ex post controls across entire
297
agencies or even entire regulatory fields.
The point, of course, is not to question the aims of transparency
that Cox, Rodríguez, and Andrias rightly praise. But to the extent
that mechanisms for interbranch coordination already figure into the
structure of everyday administrative enforcement, those internal
separation of powers can also be relevant to the legitimacy of topdown initiatives. Currently, there is little evidence that agencies
actually draw on the expertise of career officers, who may understand
the long-term interests of the agency as well as some political
appointees who lack actual enforcement experience. Put differently,
innovation may be less served by top-down administrative-law
mechanisms than drawing on pockets of expertise that already exist.
This does not mean that top-down solutions are always ill-advised; on
the contrary, they are necessary to resolve discrepancies taking place
on the ground and to ensure that immigration policy achieves the
goals set by those both responsible and accountable for making
across-the-board decisions. But leaving room for vertical dialogue and
debate can fortify those top-down decisions. An organic approach
based on bottom-up influences can have tangible and pragmatic
benefits that not only promote equity in discrete cases, but also
provide backing and normative support for agency-wide policies.
Thus, however valuable “creative unilateralism” may be for
298
immigration innovation, broad agency buy-in may be equally vital
to ensure a rule-of-law content to executive enforcement policies—
which in turn supports the case for coordinate-branch deference. The
bureaucratic ranks are not “beholden to any particular
299
administration” and yet they are generally absent from discussions
about immigration-law reform. To the extent that even the most

296. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1928
(2013) (“Agencies . . . are constantly engaging with the public: with stakeholders and other
parties affected by administrative action, social movement groups, business and industry
associations, unions, and political representatives at all levels.”).
297. See Katyal, supra note 241, at 105 (“After all, the bureaucracy is the only actor in the
political branches with a time horizon long enough to provide expertise without heavy political
interference.”).
298. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 119.
299. Katyal, supra note 6, at 2317.
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creative “Executive will need to develop policies and protocols to
300
accomplish” an agenda, bureaucratic buy-in, and input, is an
important part of that process.
C. Bottom-Up Influences and Policy Learning
Given the unlikelihood of comprehensive immigration reform
301
within the near future, bottom-up innovation and laboratories of
executive branch experimentation could be an important gap-filling
device. Thus, as opposed to relying on ex ante controls that limit
302
discretionary authority within strict parameters,
frontline
immigration officers should be encouraged to experiment with
enforcement discretion as they react and adapt to changing
circumstances. These agents can, through their exercises of case-bycase discretion, propose novel solutions for consideration by the
303
upper echelons of the administration. In that regard, frontline
enforcement discretion and positive agency redundancies provide a
304
testing ground for different viewpoints as well as a strong set of
305
in which “[d]iffering
internal agency checks and balances
perspectives allow agencies to function more like laboratories, by
306
devising new solutions to new problems.”
Although the pursuit of consistency in immigration enforcement
is an important and worthwhile endeavor, the creation of formalized
enforcement criteria could stifle appropriate, novel, and creative
exercises of discretion—in turn preventing possibilities for new
307
policies to emerge from the field. Uniform policy implementation
that crowds out the possibility of lower-level experimentation
provides no way to seek out possible alternatives. Thus, efforts to
curtail such problem solving may have the unintended consequence of
arresting this process of policy development. In other words, without
frontline discretion—and the variance that comes with it—it may not
be possible to identify who the next DREAMers will be.

300. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 125.
301. Rey Koslowski, Cross Country: Why New York Still Welcomes Immigrants, WALL ST.
J., July 28, 2012, at A15.
302. See supra note 26.
303. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 2324.
304. Id. at 2324–25.
305. Id. at 2318.
306. Id. at 2325.
307. DAVIS, supra note 251, at 20 (“[C]reativity is impossible without discretion.”).
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Recognizing this point, some higher-level officials have
specifically called for more input from the ground level. In a recent
speech to immigration lawyers, Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security Alejandro Mayorkas expressed optimism in having “ICE . . .
engage . . . fully in the spirit of openness and transparency that are the
hallmarks of good government and significantly in the service of
308
justice . . . . [and] collaboration.” Many of the case studies in Part III
illustrate such collaboration and the analogous ways that frontline
officers creatively solved immigration problems in advance of
subsequent across-the-board solutions. Within these disparate
contexts, discretion at the bureaucratic level filtered up important
309
issues “from the bottom of the agenda nearer to the top” —arguably
helping to advance important issues that required a categorical fix.
Although regulatory overlap brings costs “in both dollars and
310
311
legal certainty” —not to mention inefficiency —the combination of
frontline discretion and positive agency redundancies can “encourage
312
optimal legal evolution” and provide an array of benefits—including
“acknowledging more effectively the complex identity of the subjects
of regulation; overcoming regulatory inertia; encouraging innovation
in regulatory design; and facilitating integration across jurisdictional
313
lines.” By fostering a greater number of perspectives across a range
of different situations, internal separation of powers within the
executive branch can enhance mechanisms for dialogue, interchange,
and progress.
Finally, lower-level innovation addresses some of the narrowing
effects of substantive agency regulations. As scholars have noted,
“notice-and-comment rulemaking is ossifying, and formal

308. See supra note 94.
309. See David Luban, The Moral Complexity of Cause Lawyers Within the State, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 711 (2012).
310. Ahdieh, supra note 52, at 896.
311. Todd Aagaard’s examination of OSHA and the EPA similarly found both positive and
negative effects of regulatory overlap. Aagaard, supra note 50, at 238, 292. He found that
regulatory overlap between OSHA and the EPA could “increase reliability and encourage
policy innovation,” id. at 292, but also warned that “[r]egulatory overlap leads to duplicative
regulation, which is wasteful, inefficient, and unduly burdensome.” Id. at 238.
312. Ahdieh, supra note 52, at 891. Ahdieh also argues that, “[w]hatever the source,
distinctly situated agencies may encourage regulatory innovation, simply by offering each other
something new.” Id. at 892.
313. Id. at 870.
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314

adjudication is burdensome.” Preserving discretion on the ground
allows officers, in their day-to-day activities, to develop creative
solutions to problems by extending protections to new categories of
immigrants in response to changing facts and circumstances.
Although bureaucratic discretion brings variance and inconsistent
315
application of the law, raising concerns of its own, the continued
flexibility of prosecutorial discretion provides the breathing room
necessary for regulatory innovation—a positive good in the
enforcement context. Indeed, the lack of substantive regulation could
be important to ensuring the continued existence of lower-level
innovation. As one official in legacy INS noted, “[t]he diversity of
human activities tends to continually generate new factors and issues
316
which should logically affect the exercise of discretion.”
To be sure, controls are needed to prevent and cure vast
discrepancies in lower-level implementation—a surrogate for the
317
absent judiciary. Thus, oversight by the higher echelons at the back
end of the process, including the president, is not only reasonable but
also necessary to ensure that room for experimentation by
318
decentralized actors is exercised appropriately and equitably. But,

314. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1490 (2005).
315. See supra notes 274–77 and accompanying text; cf. ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST
OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 240 (2012)
(“Equal treatment of litigants may be purchased at the cost of getting to a correct or better
answer . . . .”).
316. COLIN S. DIVER, AGENCY ARTICULATION OF POLICY: REPORT TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (1983).
317. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999)
(upholding broad executive branch enforcement discretion despite claims that prosecutorial
discretion was used in a discriminatory manner).
318. Some level of bureaucratic insulation may be inevitable, see David B. Spence, Agency
Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 199, 207–09, 214 (1997), and indeed even desirable, Stephenson, supra note 3,
at 57–58 (noting that “aggressive political monitoring that deprives agencies of policymaking
autonomy may erode agency incentives to invest in expertise, thereby raising the costs to elected
politicians of acquiring policy-relevant information”). But for scholars who advocate for
presidential control, executive oversight is critical to ensure that agencies are democratically
accountable. See Blumenstein, supra note 3, at 887 (“Given that agency rulemaking does
contemplate a role for political input . . . it becomes hard to see why a presidential
administration should not direct or at least influence its agents’ exercise of discretion within the
agency bureaucracy.”); Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No
Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 570–71 (1987) (“Presidential oversight . . . broadens . . . an
unduly parochial approach by an agency and helps [it] take other values into account when
reaching important decisions. . . . Presidential oversight . . . incorporat[es] the prevailing political
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like federalism, ground-level executive experimentation provides a
window into policy in action, requiring interaction—not
atomization—among the higher and lower echelons of the federal
319
And just as the federalism debate informs
bureaucracy.
conversations about exclusive federal authority over immigration,
experimentation by frontline federal officers presents alternatives to
the idea of top-down innovation, highlighting the importance of a
vibrant interplay between higher- and lower-level agency actors
charged with executing and implementing policy.
CONCLUSION
Many of the mechanisms associated with more experimental
regimes remain untapped within federal immigration law. Thus,
policymakers structuring agency relationships should consider
additional ways for higher-level federal officials to pay attention to,
and learn from, ground-level experiments. Exposure to lower-level
problems and solutions would vest policymakers—including, but not
limited to, the White House and the higher echelons of the executive
branch—with greater understanding not only of the practicalities of
day-to-day enforcement, but solutions forged on the ground. The
result would be more workable recommendations for across-theboard change and a lower likelihood of pushback or obstructionism
from the ground level.
One possible mechanism to enhance higher-level learning would
involve increased field visits, where lower-level agents could report
their struggles and successes. The agency might also encourage
bureaucratic officers to attend conferences where they could explore
and discuss, at a peer level, their responses to, and resolution of,
complex and unforeseen cases. Finally, advisory councils composed of
field directors could allow frontline officers to report their
experiences. DOJ currently employs such a model in the Attorney
General’s Advisory Committee of U.S. Attorneys. This council “gives
United States Attorneys a voice in Department policies” and advises
the attorney general by “mak[ing] recommendations to improve
management of United States Attorney operations and the

climate into an agency’s discretion while maintaining allegiance to the relevant factors defined
in the legislation.”).
319. Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 5, at 608 (noting, as a benefit of immigration federalism, “the
possibility of a relationship between the levels of government that is based on dialogue and
compromise”).
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relationship between DOJ and the federal prosecutors. It also helps
formulate new programs for improvement of the criminal justice
320
system and the delivery of legal services at all levels.” The DOJ
321
model could easily be transplanted to DHS.
These mechanisms should also be paired with better data
collection about the bases upon which lower-level officers currently
322
exercise their discretion. The data should be collected, and shared,
to promote better understanding among similarly situated actors
throughout different parts of the federal bureaucracy. Although there
323
is some indication that DHS already collects some data, a more
scrupulous accounting of the bases for discretion could help identify
problems that require across-the-board action, bringing uniformity
and regularity to enforcement decisions. Enhancements such as these
would present better opportunities for learning by those
administrative arms of the executive that handle immigration.
***
Current agency structures, which already pair lower-level
enforcement discretion with separated immigration functions across
numerous different agencies and subagencies, should be better
harnessed to promote laboratories for competing viewpoints and
policy learning. Not unlike the federalist model, which posits novel
and innovative immigration policy through the lens of a bottom-up

320. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, TITLE 3: EOUSA § 32.530 (1997), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-3-2000-united-states-attorneys-ausas-specialassistants-and-agac#3-2.530 [http://perma.cc/X87Z-M5VX].
321. Currently, there is no field officer presence on DHS’s 38-member Homeland Security
Advisory Council, which provides independent advice and recommendations to the Secretary
“to support decision-making across the spectrum of homeland security operations.” United
States Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council, http://www.
dhs.gov/homeland-security-advisory-council [http://perma.cc/4QTJ-UXDG]; see United States
Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council Members, http://www.
dhs.gov/homeland-security-advisory-council-members [http://perma.cc/W7CP-N4J4] (detailing
the council’s membership).
322. The Office of the Inspector General published a report on May 4, 2015, making a
similar recommendation. Office of the Inspector General, DHS Missing Data Needed to
Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts (May 4, 2015), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-85_May15.pdf [http://perma.cc/YS8F-JULM]. The report recommended
that DHS “develop and implement a plan to collect, analyze, and report data on the
Department’s use of prosecutorial discretion to assess immigration enforcement activities and
improve future policy.” Id. at 7.
323. See supra notes 217–20, 228, 276–77 and accompanying text.
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internal
process generated by state and local governments,
separation of powers within the executive branch could put current
agency structures to more fruitful and innovative ends. This sort of
creative discretionary decisionmaking at the ground level lays a
foundation for the possible emergence of large-scale and across-theboard solutions. Moreover, executive branch programs that enjoy
broad bureaucratic support are better insulated from congressional or
judicial override. Although the top-down theory of innovation
resonates with much of the surrounding administrative-law literature,
a competing theory couched in frontline bureaucratic discretion may
ultimately prove more durable, both in the federal courts and in the
court of public opinion.

324. Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 5, at 573 (“[F]ederalism serves as a crucial mechanism for
shaping and managing national identity [and] the process of forging such identity is not a topdown, but a bottom-up process.”).

